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SOCIAL IDEALS AND THE LAW¹

I

WE have welcomed in recent years the renewal of the ancient alliance between philosophy and the natural sciences. My message to the members of the American Philosophical Association at this time is to urge the revival of the equally ancient and honorable alliance between philosophy and the law. Philosophy needs an interest in the law to recover for itself the motivation that belongs only to matters of felt importance, and the respect that is accorded only to those who are making a contribution to the life of their times. The law needs philosophy to restore to itself that direction, clarification, and background, which it appears to have lost in this era of revolution and new deals. It is no accident that the philosophers of the grand tradition from Plato, Aristotle, and Thomas Aquinas, to Spinoza, Kant, and T. H. Green, found in the law the culmination and application of their philosophies. It is no accident because it was an original and continuous motivation in all their researches and speculations. And it is no accident that the great jurists and statesmen have been men of profound ethical, political, and metaphysical philosophies. To judge the right and to enact the just presupposes a social philosophy, and a social philosophy demands as background a metaphysical or religious *Weltanschauung*.

The relationship between the two fields has been variously conceived. According to Aristotle ethics is a part of politics. The legislative and judicial processes, he thinks, are directed towards ends, and these ends are identical with the ends of life itself. Ethics, therefore, is the branch of politics which investigates the ends of

¹ The presidential address to the western division of the American Philosophical Association at the State University of Iowa, April 24, 1936.

life. It is, however, just as defensible to regard politics as subordinate to ethics, since ethics seeks to determine the nature of the right and the good while the law is concerned with the policies and agencies for achieving them. This was the view of Bentham, who a century ago was promulgating the revolutionary doctrine that laws and institutions should be tested by their ethical consequences. That this view is not yet fully accepted is indicated by the fact that Felix S. Cohen thought it worth while to devote a large part of his book, *Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals*, to the vindication of the ethical standard for the evaluation of law. He has done the task so thoroughly, and refuted alternative standards so adequately, that we shall assume this relationship as proved. In any case it is obvious that to discuss the ends of legislation without ethics, and to discuss the ends of life independently of the political and judicial instruments for realizing them, are equally futile. The ethical relationship, however, is only one of the many contacts between the two fields, and in introducing my own theme I wish briefly to indicate a few of the mutual problems.

Ultimately a philosophy of law, as Professor Jordan insists, involves a metaphysics of Will. The legislative act and the act of will meet in a common object, namely purpose. Much of contemporary philosophy with its emphasis on the problems of knowledge, of reference, of symbolism, etc., is weak in its application to law, for the simple reason that these questions do not implicate ends whereas all questions of law do. Logical positivism clarifies the relation of conceptual structures to the data on which they are based, but has as yet developed little as to the nature of the knower, the status of the future, or the function of ends. Moreover the sharp dualism of reason and emotion which the system emphasizes may render it inadequate in a field characterized by process, purpose, and future reference. Russell, whose earlier work is not unrelated to contemporary positivism, divested himself of metaphysical and epistemological encumbrances when he entered the fields of politics and education. The curious split between the two aspects of his work suggests a functional weakness in the dualism referred to. Perspective realism makes contributions of interest and of undoubted value to the problem of the relation of percipient to object, but hardly does justice to the rôle of the per-

ceiver, who brings to bear on the observation his own apperceptive mass and controlling purpose. Again, it has only begun to extend itself beyond the problems of epistemology. The same remarks apply to objective realism. I suggest that the attempt to apply the methods and principles of relativism, positivism, etc., to the fields of ethics and law would provide a thorough test of their consistency and adequacy.

The concept of relativity raises problems in law both of theory and practice. If it is the case that there is no absolute simultaneity and no absolute succession (at least where the time-interval is small) there can be no causality in the traditional meaning of the term. Many accept this implication and assert that for scientific purposes that concept is *passé*. This may be the case, but its rejection would demand the revision of a great deal of legal theory. We have always held people responsible for their acts, believing that in some sense they are the source and author of the consequences. Perhaps we have been mistaken. Perhaps instead of attempting to locate blame it would be better to make such statistical and structural analyses as would reveal the conditions under which objectionable happenings occur. This procedure works well in workmen's-compensation legislation, where the principle of liability without blame is employed. It has been suggested that it would work equally well as a method of handling automobile accidents. Insurance companies would carry the risks, and in case of accident the only question would be the amount of damages, thus clearing the courts of an unwieldy mass of futile litigation. How far the principle of liability without blame could be extended let those determine who substitute statistics and differential equations for causal analysis. But upon those who, like myself, retain the concepts of causality and responsibility I urge the necessity of *formulating an adequate causal theory*.

The need of a thoroughly revised notion of causality is indicated by our complete failure to solve the problem of responsibility in cases of concentrated power. The exercise of power is of the greatest public concern, since from the point where power is centered there issues a stream of decisions, orders, and propaganda, which affect millions of lives. Our overemphasis on the doctrine of individual responsibility leads us to believe that we have settled

a grave social problem when we have found a victim to punish, or it makes us endure almost intolerable evils so long as no individual oversteps the customary lines of conduct. Socialists on the other hand absolve the individual from blame and condemn 'the system'; the result is a cynical indifference which permits, even encourages, abuses which could be corrected. Both the individual and the system are abstractions, and neither can be the cause apart from the structure of the organization as a whole. Sometimes the system would work satisfactorily if the individuals who comprise it were better men; sometimes the men would be decent enough if the system gave scope for their better qualities. We eliminate the individual, but the corporate purposes remain unchanged; we change the system, but the new organization reproduces the same abuse of power. What appears to be demanded is an analysis of the conditions under which the qualities desired could grow and survive. The causal relationship involved is not the simple linear or chain type exemplified in elementary mechanics, but a type analogous to an implicative system exemplified in the more complex biological and social orders.

Time and the demands of unity forbid a more extended survey of the mutual problems of philosophy and the law. What I urge is not so much a greater devotion to the philosophy of law (though our somewhat scanty contributions to this field would indicate a fruitful field for exploration), but a more thorough and comprehensive study of the problems which belong to philosophy proper but which find their application in politics and law. The law awaits some definite results from our investigations which will provide the sort of basis for modern law which mediaeval theology provided for feudal law, which Eighteenth-Century rationalism provided for the new democracies, and which Nineteenth-Century utilitarianism and idealism provided for the reform movement.

With a general pragmatic and idealistic background I have devoted considerable study to the nature and function of ideals. It seems to me that this study receives some encouragement in its application to the law, and at the same time throws some light on the problems of legislation and adjudication which are bewildering the land today. While I shall not reach ultimate con-

clusions on the metaphysical basis of a philosophy of law, I believe the approach to the matter is along fruitful lines.

II

Recent years have witnessed many innovations in legislation and administration; but neither the popular nor the legal mind has been able to assimilate them into its conceptual organization; for the new movements run counter to all modern philosophies of law and politics. It has been said that "We have stood too long on the Eighteenth-Century concept of reason and the Nineteenth-Century concept of freedom". But have we anything better to substitute for these organizing ideas? 'Progress' seemed for a time to herald a new and better century, based as it was on the prevailing theory of evolution. But the savagery of the World War, the revival of paganism in Germany, the resurrection of the spirit of conquering Rome in Italy, and the recrudescence of economic nationalism everywhere, have shattered our easy optimism. The triumphant march of civilization towards universal coöperation, the theme of H. G. Wells' *Outline of History*, has been blocked at every point by economic barriers, armaments, and class hatreds.

Nevertheless there appears to be one prevailing spirit, and that a hopeful one, underlying all these reactionary manifestations. It is the confidence of man in his ability to shape the world, or at least his own land, to his own ideals. Creative evolution and creative revolution have caught the imagination of man. Planned economic orders, controlled production, national housing schemes, five-year plans, projects such as the Tennessee-Valley Authority, are all expressions of his confidence in his ability to build his habitation according to his own plan. The Nineteenth Century brought science into the field of industry; the Twentieth Century aims to bring science into the social order. And our century is not content with science alone but demands the addition of art. In this country we have grown a little sceptical of Yankee ingenuity and would appreciate a little more of Southern beauty. "The State is no work of art", said Hegel. "It exists in the world, and thus in the realm of caprice, accident, and error." Rightly or wrongly

the modern world is convinced that the State is a work of art and can be redeemed from caprice, accident, and error.

The direction which legislation is taking becomes clear if we glance back over the statutes enacted in England for the last hundred years. One group of laws covers the reform of criminal law so as to bring the treatment of crime into line with the growing humanitarian sentiments. This is the kind of law which requires a police force and which represents the State in its capacity as the source of commands. The main part of this reform was completed by 1832, later acts consolidating existing law both statutory and common. A second group of laws are those regulating factories, mines, woman- and child-labor, education, etc. Such laws set up standards, and their enforcement requires not policemen but inspectors. The range of activities thus regulated by parliament grew steadily during the century and the inspecting forces increased enormously. While the maintaining of standards promotes full and free development of individuality it does not directly create; it removes obstacles but otherwise leaves nature to take her course. The third type of legislation is in its infancy. It was heralded by such concrete programs as that of the British Labor Party in 1928, and by such pieces of legislation as the Workman's Compensation Act (1919), Housing and Town Planning Act (1919), National Health Insurance Act (1920), Unemployment Insurance (1920). The drafting of such acts requires the services of expert engineers, actuaries, economists, etc. Their administration requires, not policemen or inspectors, but competent and expert managers of new organizations. Legislation of this kind represents the State in its constructive capacity rather than in its merely prohibitive and regulatory aspects.

In the United States the people have been slowly and reluctantly converted to the desirability of such government enterprises. We have recognized the need of a direct attack on physical problems, but we hesitate to endorse a similarly direct attack on economic and industrial problems. The creation of national forests and game-preserves was one of the first achievements. National highways by federal aid, flood-control, soil-conservation, are now recognized as national in scope. Questions of state rights and government in business disappear when such disasters as the Mississippi floods,

the Johnstown floods of this spring, and the dust storms of last year, attract the attention of the whole nation. The distance we have travelled becomes evident when it is noted that the Constitution gives specific permission for Federal management of only two organizations, post-office and defence.

When we think of legislation we are apt to think of the State, and to become awed by the majesty of the law, its imposing ceremonial, and its divine or inspired origin. We can get a more sensible view of the whole matter if we think of the administration of a club or a society, a university or a city. In many ways the city is the most natural and organic of all institutions under government. Now in the city we have long ceased to think that the public function ceases with the protection of life and property and establishing standards for milk-supply, sanitary conditions, etc. Our engineers plan the streets, parks, and bridges; our school-board operates an expanding school-system; other boards supervise libraries, playgrounds, museums, art institutes, etc. The city owns and controls its water, light, and power, its hospitals, swimming pools, and markets, its fire department, relief agencies, and police courts. The notion that a government simply issues orders, that the police power enforces them, and that the judges interpret the commands of the sovereign power and adjudicate disputes, is so archaic that most of us forget, except on those rare occasions when we absent-mindedly pass a red light without stopping, that city government has anything to do with issuing commands.²

The trend in legislation and administration which we have indicated above lies in extending the well established public function as exercised in the city to the broader field of the state and nation. What this would mean for the judicial function and for a philosophy of law we shall attempt to indicate presently.

III

Though we find a definite trend towards constructive legislation, and many examples both in city and state, we are disconcerted

² Morris R. Cohen points out that even in setting up agencies and organizations the law is mandatory. It seems to me, however, that there is a wide difference between the mandatory act which lays down the rules for the game of life and that which sets up health-services, schools, public theatres, etc.

to find no generally accepted philosophy of law which sanctions the movement or provides for it a guide. Either governments are transgressing their proper functions or our philosophies of politics and law are woefully out of date. The ideal is the central feature of constructive legislation, but it is the one thing to which no contemporary legal theory gives a place. This statement may be challenged and certainly demands elucidation.

The natural-rights theory appears highly idealistic; but if each person is born with a complete set of inalienable rights as his natural endowment there is no possibility of an organized society. If there were such private rights they would have to be transformed in the organization, just as sodium must lose its metallic lustre and chlorine its pungent odor in forming common salt. We cannot, for example, have both individual liberty and social equality, for if competition is free inequalities are bound to develop, while if some semblance of equality is to be maintained restrictive measures must be adopted. Any plan to build a better city or a better state will be blocked by the fact that the plans interfere with someone's inalienable right to liberty or equality. What is purely subjective resists becoming objective and organic.³

The individualistic utilitarian theory combined with the *laissez-faire* doctrine is equally inimical to social ideals. It assumes that God's way of ruling the universe is to lay down certain principles and let them work themselves out. In imitation of the divine plan governments should establish the laws of free unlimited competition. Just as mechanical laws have evolved a harmonious system out of chaos, so economic laws left undisturbed will produce the best of possible social orders. Any attempt to set up an ideal for the solution of a public need will obviously result in confusion and failure. This childish faith in the efficacy of natural law underlies much of our political and legal thinking, and is utterly at variance with the trend towards constructive legislation.

The positive theory of law is based on a similar concept of the relation of legislation to natural law. Laws give expression to the prevailing group-customs or to the dominant group-interests, and they derive their force from the inevitable social and economic

³For a cogent and convincing treatment of this point see Jordan, E., *Forms of Individuality*.

movements that shape history. Laws not in keeping with these customs, interests, and movements, are doomed to neglect and failure. If this is the case then it is futile for us to attempt to use law to shape the future. As Roscoe Pound says: "The most that man may do is to observe and thus, it may be, to predict. For the rest nature will take her inexorable course and we may but impotently wring our hands."

The theory of law based on Will might appear to provide a basis for constructive legislation; but it has suffered from two defects. In the first place the Will has been identified with an absolute immanent Will in nature which renders individual human wills all but impotent. Hegel states that "This vast congeries of volitions, interests, and activities constitute the instruments and means of the World-Spirit for attaining its object. . . . In relation to this independently universal and substantial existence all else is subordinate, subservient to it, and the means for its development." In the second place the Will, as embodied in law, is conceived as expressing itself in injunctions and commands. Kohler, who adopts Hegel as his master, illustrates this point. He writes: "The law issues commands and prohibitions, the essence of which is not that the rights of individuals shall be preserved, but that the original interests of culture in general shall be promoted." Kohler recognized that the law must be adapted to the cultural ideal of the times, and ultimately to the cultural ideal of humanity in its final destiny; but except for a few scattered hints he conceives of law as a set of commands and prohibitions. It is only a step from this view to that of Will as force which must overcome all opposition both within and without the state. If the will of the state is the representative of the Will of the universe then anything that questions or opposes it is immoral, irrational, and treasonable. This is the basis of the unreason underlying fascist Germany today. It has its ideal, but it is one not open to discussion or criticism. The state has identified its ideal with divine destiny.

One more theory of law must be mentioned. It is that which finds the source of law in human wants and demands, and which finds the criterion of law in the satisfaction of as many as possible. This is Roscoe Pound's final conclusion. He says: "For the purpose of understanding the law of today I am content with a picture

of satisfying as much of the whole body of human wants as we may with the least sacrifice."⁴ Admitting that human wants and demands bear some relation to the law, we are inclined to think that this view leads into a *cul de sac*. All activity springs from life's drives, demands, wishes, etc.; and the law bears no unique relationship to them. They give life its impetus, but do not distinguish human society from those of ants or cattle, or distinguish public from private affairs. As Aristotle so well said, it is communication that makes a society under law possible, and it is in the region of language and discussion that we must seek for the nature of law. We can, he writes, discuss rationally such matters as the good and the beautiful, the desirable and the undesirable, the just and the unjust. We can discuss policies and principles and plans. Out of these come public policies and the law.

The danger in this theory lies in interpreting wants in their subjective immediacy. This, of course, is not what Pound intended; but since his thesis lies undeveloped it is open to this interpretation. If the satisfaction of wants is the end of law, then the politician can hardly be blamed if he estimates demands in terms of letters and telegrams, nor the judge if he keeps his ear to the ground to catch the public clamor. Those who demand nothing will get nothing; those who want little will get little; those who make extravagant claims will get less than they demand but more than they deserve. A need of which people are not conscious can hardly be counted, and one which is unexpressed will not likely be given consideration. This is the view of Professor Fite when he asserts: "According to my view there is, and can be, no obligation to respect personal interests of those who evade the responsibility of standing for themselves." This attitude results in the pressure-group theory of government, which sees the legislature as the scene of a struggle between competing interests and the cabinet as made up of representatives of various classes such as labor, agriculture, etc.

A still deeper evil attaches to this view, and one which its advocates would not willingly harbor. If justice consists in satisfying as much as possible of the whole body of existing wants with as little sacrifice as possible, then there is no injustice in taking care

⁴ Pound, Roscoe, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law* 98-99.

that embarrassing wants do not arise. Now beyond the bare necessities of life wants are not a native endowment. They emerge with widening experience, as the taste for luxuries or music; or they can be created artificially, as agitators and advertisers well know. The tragedy of the underprivileged is not that they have so little but that they want so little. Man's inhumanity to man lies not only in what one class denies the other but in what it prevents the other from even wanting. Conversely the great philanthropists are men who, pitying the lot of the lowly, have sacrificed their life of culture in order to teach the masses to want and demand a fuller life.

Nor is the theory much better if wants are interpreted to include potential or possible ones. Then the aim would be to create as many wants as possible in order to satisfy them. It is by no means obvious that a life full of many wants all of which can be satisfied is better than a well ordered life with simple and noble ends. Plato's description of the democratic man whose unlimited appetites are subject to no rule rises to disquiet us.

Anyway, private wants are not of public concern; and few things are more despicable than the practice of using the legislature and the courts for securing satisfaction of purely private interests. Wants in themselves are impulses to action, not ends of action. They become ends when that which will satisfy them is subject to rational consideration. Ends become public ends, and thus the ends of legislation and judicial processes, when communicated and discussed, when assimilated and adopted, in the thinking of the community. The end becomes an integral part of public policy and constructive legislation when the organization is set up which will achieve its realization.

Dewey's distinction between what is public and what is private, as set forth in *The Public and its Problems*, is relevant in this connection. His general position lies back of my theory of ideals; but he hesitates to extend the functions of government as far as my own thesis would demand. His position is too strongly pluralistic to allow him to welcome extensive government activity. But *Art as Experience* provides the background which my thesis requires. Professor Beiswanger, in his paper on *The Use of Fine Art*, states Dewey's position well: "Now that mankind finds itself responsible both for envisaging and realizing the good life, art has

become the one matter of utmost concern." And, quoting Dewey, "For what ideal can man honestly entertain save the idea of an environment in which all things conspire to the perfecting and sustaining of all values occasionally and partially experienced?" It is my thesis that to achieve such an ideal environment is the function of the law.

IV

Now that we have definitely and consciously entered upon an era of constructive legislation, it becomes our business as philosophers to investigate the concepts involved, to analyse the relations embodied, and to seek the conditions of its success or failure. Presumably the legislative function is twofold: first and primarily to formulate policy, secondly to consider and devise agencies for effecting policies. Merely to discuss policy would be fruitless; merely to experiment with economic and industrial organizations would be wasteful. But to formulate policies directed towards the good, and to institutionalize them in an experimental manner, sets in motion a continuous process of legislation and administration with direction and control.

Discussion of policy is diffuse unless it is focused on the good, and the determination of the good is the highest task of dialectic. But the determination of the best objective for the immediate future demands above all things imagination. We have heard much in praise of reason in law, business in government, and lately of engineering, but little in praise of imagination. For this reason we welcomed the emphasis on the importance of imagination for philosophy in Professor Montague's Carus Lectures under the title, *Philosophy as Vision*. It is through imagination, he asserted, that crude experience is refined into the world of Platonic ideas, that the objects of perception are dissolved into the world of atoms of Democritus, that the multiplicity of scientific objects are unified in the God of Spinoza.

Imagination, as Wordsworth expounded it, is an act of divination, a sort of second sight, which pierces beneath the surface and grasps the form and meaning of reality. It is this insight, according to Bergson, which reveals to the scientist the essence or concept of the phenomena under observation. But imagination is more than divination; it is a productive act. It creates the

aesthetic object, and develops the action of the novel and the evolution of its characters according to logical principles. It constructs the future as the realm of possibilities and envisages a better self and a better world. The meliorism of William James, the ethics of T. H. Green, and the theory of constructive legislation, presuppose this use of imagination. The ideal which it sets up rescues us from the reign of chance and relativity and gives direction and significance to the action of the present.

We have become accustomed to the notion of the reign of relativity. If there is no privileged frame of reference, and if times pass away and with them the spaces also, there can be no "far off divine event to which the whole creation moves". But when an individual, whether single or corporate, fixes his goal, there is established within the realm of the relative, to use a term coined by Professor Ames, a practical absolute. For when one acts with an end in view he is reacting, not to a distant changing object, but to one which remains a present, timeless object. The action of the individual has, within the system, absolute direction; his progress or retardation is absolute for himself and for all who can appreciate his objective. Growth and progress can be given meaning only in an organization in which all organic parts contribute to the life of the whole, and in which the whole has direction in the sense that it progressively realizes an end.

Ends imply will. To have a will means to be master of momentary impulses, to subordinate passing wants to more stable rational ends, to harmonize present needs with long-run aims. The will represents the whole personality as opposed to partial and temporary selves. No better definition of the whole self can be given than that it is the growth from the past and present self into the ideal personality which realizes the possibilities of the present. This, if I am not mistaken, is what is significant in T. H. Green's account of the Will. Will is the exercise of reason, the utilization of science, the concentration of forces, for the realization of the ideal self.

Public ends imply corporate will. When the immediacy of wants and the unreason of private demands are transmuted by discussion into objectives in which the community can participate, and when investigation has revealed what is of public or universal signifi-

cance, then there can be formulated public policies and envisaged the ideal of the better state. The concentration of science and engineering, of labor and wealth, in the job of realizing this ideal is the corporate will. Such a will is not satisfied merely to lay down rules by which private individuals conduct their lives, nor to issue commands and prohibitions, but rather unites individuals in public enterprises. These coöperative enterprises are initiated by constructive legislation.

The central feature of such constructive legislation is the ideal. Since the word 'ideal' is used in various senses let us pause at this point to discuss its nature. I mean by the term whatever is before the mind when we envisage the better self or the better community. In the case of those who envisage the future in visual imagery it will be a definite picture corresponding to a percept. With other people it may be anything from an outline sketch to an aggregate of symbols. One writer has defined the ideal as "the normal future"; but it seems more proper to conceive it as the more desirable future whether it will be the actual future or not. Mr. Ryle, in a symposium on "Imaginary Objects", asserts that an ideal (or any imagined object) is a complex predicate, *i.e.*, a description. The image or picture, he argues, comes later as an illustration of the imagined object. This seems to me to reverse the true relationship. The imagined object corresponds to the direct perception, while the complex predicate bears the same relation to the ideal that a description does to the percept. Professor Jordan describes the idealizing agency as "the imaginative envisaging of ends independent or indifferently to whatever content the ends may have". My study of the subject, on the other hand, leads me to conclude that general ends such as liberty, concord, etc., differ from definite ideals precisely in the fact that abstract ends admit of any content that fits the concept whereas ideals are relatively determinate. Kant had it right when he described the ideal as the idea *in individuo*. Of course the difference between idea and ideal, like that between concept and percept, is one of degree of abstraction. Generally the more distant the ideal the more sketchy it can afford to be.

It might appear from this discussion that the ideal can belong only in the imagination of the one who constructs it, and that

it is therefore subjective, private, and fanciful. It is a work of art, to be sure; but a work of art is not necessarily the product of a single genius working in isolation. A cathedral, for example, may be designed by an architect; but it embodies the ideas of the religious leaders who promote the project and thus indirectly the religious aspirations of the community. The general plan will be altered according to the ideas of several generations of builders. Moreover individual craftsmen, in the great periods of cathedral art, were allowed almost complete freedom in working out their own designs in the details of the building. Hence the almost unlimited variety in cornice and pillar, panel and gargoyle, of the great cathedrals. The genuinely communal nature of such works of art is further indicated by the use to which they are put. If, as Dewey asserts, art is what art does in the lives of people, it is absurd to think of art as individualistic. Art in Russia is said to be a much more social affair than among us, both because of the coöperative method of production fostered in their art centers, and because of the social use to which it is directed.

In a much greater measure a political ideal can be objective in the sense of being arrived at by consultation and adopted in public discussion. Public assemblies can, and should, discuss the concrete aims to which their action is directed. It is part of the function of political campaigns to win popular approval for the ideals of the rival parties, to expose their proposals to criticism, and to modify them in the light of suggestions received. Ideals could be the product of the administration alone, in which case we have government by experts. But this appears to be a mistake, since the final outcome is the concern of the whole public. Policies may be soundly constructive; the administration may be honest and efficient; and yet the undertaking may fail because the ultimate user or consumer had no part in drawing up the plans. How often have we seen university buildings which are architecturally worthy but which meet the needs neither of students nor teachers, housing projects which produce dwellings which any housewife would condemn, food laws which fail to protect the consumer! Whenever plans are matured without taking advantage of the scientific knowledge of the experts and also the experience of the user or consumer, the project is liable to failure. The ideal can

become real only when it is a development of the experience which the public already has. The political ideal can be objective both in the sense that it is not private and in the sense that it is continuous with the reality which now exists.

V

It remains for us to discuss briefly the legislative and judicial functions with reference to the ideal. The main business of the legislative branch is the formulation of policy for the public weal. Members do not represent constituencies or group-interests; they are chosen for their superior ability and vision for the purpose of determining the public good and formulating policies for its attainment. In conjunction with an expert civil service they create concrete ideals which shall embody their policies.

In most cases ideals are institutionalized by the creation, through enabling acts, of autonomous non-political organizations. The city sets up its hospital-board, library-board, parks-department, etc. The federal government sets up its various administrations or authorities. These operate independently of political changes and carry out their functions in close coöperation with the public will. Their efficiency depends upon the civil service—the trained and experienced managers, technicians, engineers, etc. Their improvement comes from the direct criticism and suggestions of the public which uses them. The claim that public organizations are unprogressive and unresponsive to public opinion can be met by comparing public libraries with private circulating libraries, state highways and bridges with toll-pikes and toll-bridges, city-owned utilities with privately owned ones, and state education with parochial schools. The response of the organization to public needs will depend on the vitality and intelligence of the people.

The autonomous organization set up may be, and probably in most cases will be, a private company chartered by the state or city. The difference between an organization created by legislative action and a corporation chartered to carry on a business lies chiefly in the location of the ideal. Both are public and serve a public function. Both are permitted to conduct their affairs in accordance with public policy as decided upon by political assemblies. But in the case of the governmental organization the ideal

is openly formulated in political discussion, while in the case of the private organization the ideals are formed in the brain of the owner or the deliberations of the directors. In the case of the governmental organization, since it exists primarily to serve a public function, the reaction of those affected can be active in remoulding and improving the business; whereas in the private corporation, since the primary object is likely to be profits or some equally limited interest, public approval or disapproval can be ignored so long as it does not interfere with these objectives. This difference, however, tends to disappear as corporations are held more and more strictly accountable for the performance of the public function which they are licensed to perform. This raises the question of the judicial function.

With regard to the main function of the judiciary I am indebted to, and find myself in agreement with, Professor Jordan's *Theory of Legislation*.⁵ A public organization set up or legalized by the government may, through faulty organizing principles, incompetence, or corruption, fail to perform its function. Such a condition would warrant a judicial investigation with the object of locating the causes of the failure. If the fault lay in the organizing principles legislative action would be recommended. Under present conditions such investigations are made, if they are made at all, by an investigating committee of the House or Senate; but this appears to be a confusion of function. If the failure is due to official corruption, trial and punishment of the offending individuals would seem to be indicated. The judicial function would thus be the same whether the organization were government-owned or privately owned, since in either case it exists to perform a public function. Graft in business would be as serious an offense as graft in government; incompetence in corporation-management would be as formidable a charge as incompetence in a government agency: bad business organization would be as subject to judicial investigation as bad organization in administration. The main function of the judiciary would, however, be the scientific one of

⁵ Professor Jordan's *Theory of Legislation and Forms of Individuality* have so much which has influenced my views, and so much to which I cannot assent, that I find it difficult to formulate my position in relation to his. Only a book as long and as tough, as profound and as trenchant, as his own would be adequate to the subject. Let me say in passing, however, that no student of the philosophy of law can afford to neglect these two great works.

enquiry, analysis, and judging. The judges determine whether or not the end or ideal is being realized, and if it is not they ascertain the causes. The judicial function is to pass upon the action of the whole, that is, upon the fitness of the means to achieve the end. In this way it would perform the pressing need of placing responsibility where power is concentrated and of holding power strictly accountable.

This brings us back to the point with which we started. The judge is not compromising conflicting interests and trying to conserve as many wants as possible. He is not a mere umpire presiding over a fight between plaintiff and defendant and trying to reach a decision that will satisfy as much as possible of the demands of each. He is judging the right, and even in cases of private litigation he is the representative of the state and gives primary consideration to the social bearings of his decision. In order to do this he must be guided by the ideals that control public policy. Judges not only live in their own generation but, like other citizens, they participate in the vision of the future. When the law consists of a clearly enunciated set of rules all the judges can do is to administer them, but this is their administrative rather than their judicial function. In most cases, however, there is room for interpretation and other devices by which judges can do their part in realizing the ideals which are taking form in society. Much has been written on the growth of the common law, its genius for keeping in harmony with changing standards of morals, and the competence of the judiciary to march with the times without the help of legislative enactments. Cardozo formulates his principle of relativity as an operational device for judging changing relationships from the point of view of fixed formulae. Long before enacted statutes mitigated extreme punishments judges found ways of bringing penalties more into harmony with the humanitarian sentiments of their age. Even the technicalities of the law and the law's delays were turned to the advantage of the prisoner. And when governments refused to legislate on private business judges devised fictions and reinterpreted old principles so as to make corporations more responsible. The point I wish to make is that even in cases of litigation and in the administration of criminal law enlightened judges have always been guided as far

as conditions allowed by ideals of the public good. Under a program of constructive legislation their merely administrative duties would disappear, and their true function of investigation, analysis, and passing judgment, would find scope.

As one who judges the right the judge should perhaps know the Good. But even if he has not a Platonic vision of the Highest Good he can at least appreciate some of the intermediate goods. Plato himself warned us not to jump too hastily from lesser particular goods to the One, but to advance step by step. The judge can share in the ideals of his generation—ideals arrived at by public discussion and achieved experimentally through self-governing organizations. For him in his judicial capacity and as the representative of the public Will these ideals will function as the Good. It will be his exalted privilege to judge the right in the light of these ideals.

I said in the beginning that a philosophy of law must rest ultimately in a metaphysics of the Will, and I realize that such a metaphysics has only been indicated. If there are social ideals that are more than a practical compromise among competing demands, then there is in some sense a corporate will that is more than the resultant of the clash of individual wills. Neither the howling pack of immediate wants nor the immanent Will of the World Spirit provides the answer to the problem of the social will incorporated in the law. The philosophy that is here suggested, but left only as a suggestion, is a dynamic idealism whose central feature is not the Hegelian *Idee*, but commonplace *ideals*.

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ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A BETTER WORLD*

IN the novel position which comes to a president of such a society as this one when he is thrust upon the stage, he will search his soul with more than ordinary candor to see if there be any wisdom or knowledge appropriately to be displayed to those who, whether in confident or in gambling mood, have singled him out to play the part. One of the differences between those of us whose vocation is the study and teaching of philosophy and other reflective men is that we conceal our ultimate beliefs behind a more or less unconscious mask of technicality. The pragmatists among us are disguised moralists. The realists come in the disguise of laboratory men. Then there are the logistic Sherlock Holmeses who offer to reconstruct the crime of existence by an analysis of the cigarette-ashes of our words. The logical positivists, with their claim that "every kind of metaphysics is meaningless, in short nothing but a play upon words",¹ do but give us a play within the play—a play upon the play upon words. These Hamlets, thrice disguised, would have us believe that on the world's stage there is but a representation of a representation of a representation.

"A philosopher", says Santayana, "cannot wish to be deceived. His philosophy is a declaration of policy in the presence of the facts; and therefore his first care must be to ascertain and heartily to acknowledge all such facts as are relevant to his action or sentiment—not less, and not necessarily more."² But Santayana like each of us is a metaphysician at heart. His disclaimer of metaphysics, with the by-play about natural science and the wayward conduct of other metaphysicians, is but a thin disguise. If perchance philosophy is "a declaration of policy in the presence of the facts", does he not offer for our consideration the hypothesis of a universe divided against itself—"the presence of the facts" and a "declaration of policy"—things and events on the one hand and a willed perception of them on the other? Surely this is not a promising course by which to escape a metaphysic.

* The presidential address to the Pacific division of the American Philosophical Association at Mills College, December 29, 1936.

¹ Hans Reichenbach, "Logistic Empiricism in Germany", *Jour. of Phil.* XXXIII 148.

² *Realm of Essence* xi.

Which of us in our sober reflection escapes the tantalizing necessity of prying more impertinently into such a dualism? Can it be that the facts and our interpretation of them are so loosely hung together that inquiry can be dismissed with this simple formula? Are the facts which we interpret the same as our interpretation of the facts? Are the facts relevant to our action or sentiment the very facts of nature? Such questions cannot be set aside for very long. They recur with the pertinacity and the finality of death. Through the lengthening years of man's discourse these questions are pervasive. Now and again with possible rhythms passing our comprehension they become recessive or dominant, quiescent or clamorous.

In our time they are clamorous. After Kant, philosophy has been, by and large, metaphysical. It was a shrewd mind which paraphrased the cry 'back to Kant' with the sounder admonition 'back around Kant'. In Kant, the protestant reformation having divested the mind of its trust in an orthodox metaphysic based on ecclesiastical authority, there was an elaborate *critique of pure reason* which withered in the bud the springing hope of a metaphysic rooted within the narrow boundaries of logomachous experience. The Kantian critique found fruit in empirical psychology with its descriptive analysis of 'streams of consciousness', psychic 'structures', and behavioristic 'patterns' on the one hand, and in a correspondingly empirical biophysics on the other. But the main current of philosophical speculation swept around and beyond Kant to issue in a variety of realisms new and old. In its essence philosophy is realistic; for it addresses itself to the central, continuing and complex problem of the nature of the real world. The greatest philosophies are distinguished from the sciences, arts, and religions, by being thus realistic in intention and emphasis. This they cannot escape.

I intend by this dogma to assert that all of the supreme efforts of the philosophical mind are metaphysical. All speculations concerning acts, words, meanings, values, internal and external relations, categories, phenomena, persons, and prejudices, are but subsidiary efforts to get at the nature of things. If by this open attempt at a definition of philosophy I can persuade you to consider what I am about to say as more than a profession of faith

to be accepted or rejected by you as your prejudices in turn conform to or diverge from mine, I shall have accomplished my initial purpose.

Within the marginal shadows of the given world at any specified moment or moments lurks a possible world. What is the ontological status of the possible? No significant answer can be offered to this question at least until an agreement has been reached as to what we are to mean by the 'given world'. This definition must be established as a base within the chosen realm of discourse by reference to which any determinations of direction or distance may be made.

By the 'given world' I do not mean to refer to a psychological present. The experience of a waking mind is unmistakably a part, but only a part, of such a world. The ivy-covered wall outside my window in the slanting light of an autumn sun, the pungent fumes of burning tobacco, the distant half-melody of men and machines—these fall together in my psychic span. Psychologically they are co-existent aspects of a determinate order of nature which they do not exhaust. By no stretch of my imagination am I able to suppose that the *de facto* world is encompassed within the feeble reach of a psychic *now*. The given or actual world for the purposes of this discussion is rather a determinate state of affairs here and elsewhere of which my experience is but a selected fragment. The characteristic distinguishing it from the possible world is that it is radically determinate. Whatever else we may mean when we speak of an actual world, we at least denote the complex, diversified, stubborn, objective state of affairs.

It is necessary to suppose that physical conditions beyond my present perception are a part of such an objective state of affairs. This necessity is so obtrusive that the physical world has often been identified with the actual world. But this is misleading; for the actual world is of a surety more than matter even if matter is, as Mill called it, the "permanent possibility of sensation". If it is a fact that, as we sit here in each other's physical presence, there are co-existent processes and events beyond these walls, then those processes and events are part of the given world. *Entia rationis*, whether called laws of nature, universals, or objective ideas in the mind of God, belong unmistakably to the determinate world.

But this is not all; for the past belongs to the actual. If it is a fact that Woodrow Wilson signed the Treaty of Versailles it is a part of the determinate world of which I speak, even if the document bearing the signature together with all subsidiary records were subsequently destroyed and with them the possibility of verification.

If an eighteenth-century philosopher dreamed of perpetual peace, that fact is as ineluctable as the fact that London is now located on the river Thames, that we face each other across this room, or that there are structured processes involved in speaking and hearing. The dream of perpetual peace can occupy its station in an actual world without the slightest embarrassment. It is the perpetual peace which hangs back with leaden steps and does not venture out of the shadows of a possible world. Of whatever it may truly be said that so-and-so is or was thus-and-so, of that the actual world is constituted. By all this I mean then that the actual world is made up of "shoes and ships and sealing wax, of cabbages and kings", but also of structured events, processes, purposes, and dreams of perpetual peace.

But having handed over the present and the past to the reign of complete determination, what shall be said of the future? Is it also determined or are many distinctions first to be made? Fatalism is the theory that future events are already predetermined, *i.e.*, fore-ordained in such a way that no present choice or action can enter as a determining factor. Fatalism does not mean that tomorrow's events are, here and now, being determined, but that they have been determined. If this supposition were entirely false it would be impossible to account for successful anticipation or prediction. If it were entirely true, though it would be possible to account for failure of anticipation and prediction by the further supposition of the fallibility of human knowledge, it would be impossible to find any rational ground for human hopes of a better world and the vast expenditure of human energy in programs of reform. I do not want to suggest that a justification of human hopes is necessary. I do not even ask whether or not it is desirable. I ask only whether or not it is possible. I shall therefore adopt the hypothesis that tomorrow is partly predetermined and partly unpredictable.

Consider briefly the nature of these hopes. Man finds himself alive in a dangerous world. Tremblingly he moves, looking before and after, longing for what is not. If by chance he escapes the immanent dangers of his individual environment, he takes note of and becomes concerned about the plight of his fellowmen. He generalizes on the basis of his individual needs and capacities—erecting programs of tribal, national, or international reform. Man is the planning animal. His dissatisfaction is not only the uneasiness of the hungry carp, but it is generalized and focused upon the future. Not half only but nine tenths of life is anticipatory.

The hopes of man may be discovered in many or even all aspects of his history. We in our own professional caves and dens express by our continuing activity the human hope for knowledge and understanding. In many respects this is the deepest and most abiding hope of all. In it there is the essence of hope, for all other hopes are at least symbolically present. Nevertheless it is hardly common enough to stand as the typical human hope, for the great majority of men do not share it, or share it only in its weakest form as instrumental to some more immediate animal striving. The zeal of this house has not eaten them up. On the whole the most universal hope of our race is probably the hope of overcoming the narrow limits of finite existence. Such hopes find expression in religion. Whether the religion be at the level of low animal cunning characterized by a ritual of sacrifices and prayers to a divine power whom we may propitiate, cajole, bargain with, and even intimidate, or whether it be at the level of systematic theology—one thread of common hope runs through it all.

Or consider the history of medicine, which is a kind of mundane theology, as another exhibition of man's hope. As you turn the pages of a work like Thorndyke's *History of Magic and Experimental Science* the cumulative impression of some deeper hope which lies beneath the search for health and long life is overpowering. Men are not reconciled to their mortality. Caution, surgery, antiseptics, anaesthetics are but episodes of the vast struggle with pain, disease, weakness, and cold death. Few pause to observe that when we conquer a disease, as the current phrase has it, we but turn the victim from one to another torture. Those who do pause to reflect upon such a somber conclusion have but

a step from medicine to eschatology. Confused and trivial minds at this point exhibit that strange and more poignant mystery of the struggle between hope and despair which brings religion and medicine together in the desperate abracadabra of such monstrous hypotheses as the non-reality of evil in all its forms. They seem to suppose that the defeat of their fondest dreams can be avoided by the simple device of shutting their eyes and pronouncing magic words.

But messiahs appear in fields other than religion and medicine. No observant person can live to mature life unmindful of the continual rise and fall of schemes for economic and social betterment. Here on this western shore we are in the midst of the most recent and perhaps the last outpost of a great migration which brought the *Mayflower* to our eastern shores and sent the covered wagon lumbering across the trackless wilderness. And for what? If you will for an idle hour cruise about on the sea of sound which comes into your living room through the mysterious devices of 'tubes', 'dials', and 'frequencies', unprejudiced in favor of "such facts as are relevant to your action or sentiment", you will discover the wake of many a passing ship bound for the ports of economic bliss. These captains and their crews are frequently guileless visionaries enchanted by a tawdry heaven of shabby creature comforts. In bovine candor they are searching for green pastures. They can severally be dismissed as trivial, ephemeral, mercenary, dim-witted; but collectively they record the springing hope of mankind for a better social order to be established in an apparently indifferent universe.

But the hopes of mankind are not all equally extravagant and improbable of realization. It is a relief to turn from the somewhat melodramatic phenomena of human hopes to the more sustained labor of men on the way to civilized living. Creative art, whether pure or applied, furnishes plenty of illustration of the search for beauty, utility, and such other values as may be suggested by the quaint phrase 'the pleasures of the imagination'. Science may be summoned to testify to man's lasting desire to understand. Codified law is perhaps the most ancient expression of man's desire to escape the haphazard brutality of an undocumented, single-handed struggle with economic, social, and political forces. In law, as in

science and in art, there is revealed to the discerning mind more than surface phenomena of statutes, procedures, and precedents; instruments, techniques, and results. In all of these there is discoverable an essential yearning, not for existence, but for a quality called civilized existence. Mere existence, even an existence moving by internal forces of biophysical evolution, is distinguishable from civilization. History, enacted or recorded, is full of axiology. Valuation is the essence of it. This crucial fact must be reckoned with by philosophy.

Voluntarism as a metaphysics may take the high ontological road leading from the hypothesis of a divine purpose which created the universe by a willed act, or it may take the low road of empirical pluralistic meliorism with its hypothesis of the recreative power of finite wills to modify the actually existent world in the direction of human tastes. Time forbids more than mention of the vast theological speculation concerning the primacy of the will in the creative genesis of things. "Olympian Zeus", says the poet, "himself distributes prosperity to men, good or bad, to each according as he wills."³ The form of this speculation is no longer in fashion, though the essence of it is retained in current voluntarisms. What most distinguishes contemporary will-philosophies from their classic antecedents is their humanism and avowed empiricism.

"Any philosophy", says the official spokesman of the Hitler state, "is exactly as strong as the will of its representatives to defend it."⁴ In this extreme dictum voluntarism as a philosophy is almost reduced to a patent madness. The undisciplined frenzy of political power will one day have to reckon with an objective world which was at least partly created before Hitler was born. He is safe who ventures no farther than this in predicting the future. But the real question of interest is: To what extent and by what means can any order, political or otherwise, be willed into existence?

The voluntaristic reformer seems to start with an unchallenged acceptance of *de facto* desires, and expends his energy in the acquisition of techniques and instruments rather than in critical reflection upon the form and limits of the desires in a structured

³ *Od.* VI 188.

⁴ *News in Brief*, Vol. II, no. 4, p. 2.

world-order. He is frequently so absorbed in getting what he wants that he may hardly be said to know what he really wants or what the world is in which those wants occur. His meliorism is frequently joined with a doctrine akin to the Spencerian faith in a "far off divine event toward which the whole creation moves".

There are various doctrines of emergence offered to furnish a kind of natural history of human values. They seem to agree that a coherent purposiveness arises out of a chance collocation of atoms or other determinate elements of reality, until consciousness appears with its mysterious power of catching the melody, or dissonance, of nature and carrying it to a greater pitch of symphonic excellence. The anthropomorphic implications of this theory are fairly evident. Man is the fruit of the tree of existence. He comes by his genius for reform naturally and undertakes the task of re-making the world with confidence. Value is treated as a simple function of human desire, and tends to be joined with operational maxims rather than with a set of categories and propositions having an intellectual or critical content. Value is carelessly taken to be a part of nature in its simple existential givenness rather than what it really is—a function of critical intelligence with its reflective interpretation of the given.

Meliorism, as a theory of value, implies certain metaphysical dogmas. I mention only two. First, it implies that nature is cognate to human desires and so articulated with them that they may become determinants of it in the plastic processes of its formation. All instrumentalisms imply such a dogma. With this I take no issue; for it seems evident to me that the classic severance of man from the rest of nature, giving him some transcendent status, can no longer hold up its head in the presence of common observation and the systematic study of the biological sciences. It may be granted by all of us, so it would seem, that, however peculiar in structure, aptitudes, habits, *et cetera*, man may be, he is nevertheless bounded by and set within the vast matrix of the natural world and of a single piece and pattern with it.

The second implication of meliorism is that the nature of things is not only undergoing some transformation involving and closely articulated with human desires as operative factors, but that the transformation is convergent and cumulative in the production

and conservation of values. In order to make such an hypothesis acceptable it would be necessary, first of all, to suppose that there is an actual congruence of the *de facto* desires and willed acts of human beings. If the evidence on this point is sufficient, it would still be necessary to show that, in addition to the natural congruence of human desires, there is also an integration of them in such a way that they can become effective for the production of a better world.

All institutions and organizations among men, however ephemeral, are, as far as they go, evidence of congruent purposes. That there are some central tendencies amidst the variety, the diversity, and the conflicts, of human desires is, therefore, sufficiently attested. These central tendencies, however, have so far been productive of conflicting social organizations such as nations, labor unions, churches, and seem actually to have intensified the conflict between the groups rather than to have led in the direction of peace and amity among them. We seem as far from universal peace as we ever were.

But however improbable such a unification or harmonization of all human interests may appear to be, it is not inherently impossible. More rigorous analysis of the flux of psychological desire might yield some common denominator, some irreducible basic factor of which the others are rational variables. If a universal dictator with occult powers of insight and persuasion should arise, the minds of men might become so fused and coördinated as to be almost or quite dominated by some single common purpose. Political or religious leaders have accomplished marvels on small scales, and their reign of influence has often persisted well beyond the time of their generation. The fact that new interests have arisen to dissipate the power of such unifying ideas is no guarantee that a better analysis of human nature or a more miraculous intuition of its central tendency should not succeed in time to come. However improbable, therefore, let us grant that it might chance to be so.

It is the second condition mentioned, namely, that a mere multitude of human desires, whether they be the successive desires of an individual or the simultaneous and successive desires of many men, can become effective in the betterment of the objective world,

which seems to me to be inherently unrealizable. The evils which confront the race are unconquerable, not because they constitute a brute stone wall erected by a sardonic power against which men are predestined to beat out their futile lives, but because in the exercise of multiple choice itself there are far-reaching ontological effects which, in part, at least, enter creatively into the determinate constitution of the world. What a man wants is never what he gets—at the very least, he gets more than he wants, because the determinate order which makes wants and the processes of their satisfaction significant is such that *X*'s are linked with *Y*'s and *Z*'s. The discovery and identification of *X* involves other determinate conditions and thus on to infinity. The Sisyphean labor does not suffice to make the actual and the possible worlds one.

There is, however, an important difference between the desires of an individual and the desires of a society or a race. The desires of the individual may be integrated or unified through a process of critical growth. The desires of a group of individuals show no corresponding process. In order to say more nearly what I mean I need to distinguish between two kinds of desire. There are mere psychological desires which I shall call desires of the first intention, appropriating a phrase from logic. The characteristics of such a desire are a maximum degree of immediacy, accompanied on its psychophysical side by heightened vital processes, an energizing of nerves and muscles, certain definite and appropriate orientation of the whole psychophysical organism to the anticipation and reception of stimuli connoted by the name of some desired object. A second desire or class of desires might be called desires of the second intention. They differ from the first in degree of immediacy and intensity, in instrumentation and direction. The most significant distinction between the two classes of desire, however, amounts to a difference in kind. Desires of the first class are analogous to the particular object or event as treated in classic epistemological theory, while those of the second intention are of the order of universals or generalizations. Though it would be egregious to pursue this analogy into the intricate jungle of distinctions and difficulties familiar to us all, it may furnish some connotation for the terms about to be used. The desires which appear as matters of psychological fact in or on

the surface of the psychic stream, or pond as the case may be, are the moment-by-moment wants of a mind or any number of such minds if taken discretely. I shall call them merely *desires*. When these same desires are taken in their relational or patterned integration, I shall call them the rational will or the will.

Desires of the first intention, that is, in their variety and multiplicity, may properly be attributed to the individual and to the sum of individuals which make up the race. The rational will or desire taken in the second intention, however, is a characteristic of individual minds only and not a characteristic of groups of minds however large or small.

The quality and intensity or the social extensity of any given psychological desire offers no reliable indication of the probability of its realization in the objective world-order. The intensity of my desire for any result is no presumptive evidence whatever of the possibility of its objective realization. It is only in so far as I desire also all means leading to it and all consequences of it in an actual determinate world that my desire for it becomes a significant index of effective realization. It is not the psychological but the logical will which enters into the ethically significant formation of tomorrow.

The evidence for an integrated or rational will as a phenomenon of a growing individual person is readily at hand. The phenomena of 'closure' or psychological integration are well known and call for no review in this connection. Where the desires or willed acts in question are the acts of a single conscious mind they may form an effective instrument for the reconstruction of an objective state of affairs. Such a rational will is the laborious achievement of individual minds and may almost be taken as the essence of the person. The process of growth and education by which such integrated persons arise is familiar to reflective minds. That the immediate objective order can be transformed by such rational persons is also well within the experience of each of us. But meliorism is a metaphysical not a psychological doctrine. The question for us therefore is whether or not there may be a rational integration of the desires and willed acts of different individuals such as to warrant the hope of a better world as the result of combined human effort.

I do not doubt that the objective structure of the social and economic order is probably in part a resultant of willed acts in their collective relation. All that I do assert is that this objective structure shows no one-to-one correspondence to any desire or impulse discoverable in the desires of the first intention or any possible collection thereof. The satisfaction of any random desire or uncoordinated number of desires at the level of the first intention is as likely to make the world worse as it is to make it better. The acts of many persons taken together may produce in an objective world-order any transformation which you care to suppose, save only that the emergent or eventual state of affairs will be far different from what was psychologically desired by any or all of them. It will be complex, impersonal, distributive, and determinate.

Suppose we imagine a society of any number of individuals each of whom is severally actuated by an identical desire for food or diversion, that is, a desire of the first intention. Make the particular supposition that every individual in the group desires a ham sandwich or an hour's diversion at the moving pictures. The direct satisfaction of either of these desires would breed or produce a very complex world-order having no remote resemblance to a ham sandwich or a moving picture. It would be more like the determinate world which we actually confront. There would be breeders and farmers, slaughterhouses and Hollywoods, transportation and markets and—trouble. None of the individuals, being consulted, could properly declare that he contemplated the entire objective state of affairs as the object of his desire, though some of them might reasonably be expected to *know* enough about the interrelation of things and events of a determinate world to achieve a dispassionate view of the entire transaction and perhaps even to will it at the level of second-intention desires and thus to incarnate the rational will in their individual lives.

There is a world of difference between the wild impulse to eat, to run, or to breed, and a logical will which intelligently anticipates and accepts the implications of its action. Roughly this is the difference between a biophysical existence in an actual world and a civilized life in a possible one. Individual men are capable of civilized participation in a rational or possible world. There is no

evidence that a group of men large or small exhibits the phenomena of desire at the level of second intention. The collocation of civilized individuals has as its emergent or resultant a determinate state of affairs called society. But we may not attribute to the aggregate or composite structure the characteristics of its several components. Here at least we seem to have an episode in evolutionary emergence in which the 'onward and upward' is turned back to a subpersonal and prevaluative structure.

'Better' and 'worse' have no footing in the actual world if taken all by itself. Value is a function of a perceived relation between worlds actual and possible, and occurs only at the level of the understanding mind—neither below it nor above it. I hold it to be reasonably certain that the factual satisfaction of a desire or impulse at the level of first intention has existential status but no value-significance. It occurs below the level of the understanding mind. Above that level in the evolutionary series is society, which has as such neither the desire and its satisfaction nor the understanding mind. A recent writer seems to say what I mean. "This is the irony of the situation. Is evolution progress? Yes, but only to those who, themselves 'produced' in the evolutionary process itself, make those assumptions, either tacitly or explicitly, that imply this conclusion. *But to the evolutionary process itself, as a whole, neither 'Yes' nor 'No'.* To it it is a matter of supreme indifference whether such assumptions are made as will enable one of its own products to show that it is progress or not. The Evolutionary Process, *as a whole*, does not value; it has no interests; it does not make selections as to what shall be regarded as *instances* of the good; it does not attempt to order these 'goods' so as to find a *Summum Bonum*; it does not assume *one* of these values to be something that is *both a standard and not a standard*. I conclude, then not that value and the instances of this, Goodness, Beauty and Aesthetic value, are dependent on human beings—indeed, I maintain the opposite—but only that *the selecting and the ordering* is 'human'."⁵

He who wants peace at the level of first-intention desire must learn to want what peace entails. If peace entails war, as many reasonably suppose, then he who wants peace must learn to want

⁵ Spaulding, E. G., *A World of Chance* 267-8. His italics.

peace and war. In the words of Heraclitus, "Homer was wrong in saying 'Would that strife might perish from among gods and men'. He did not see that he was praying for the destruction of the universe; for, if his prayer were heard, all things would pass away."⁶ The invention of the bridge enabled men to cross the river without getting wet. By the same token it is not impossible that peace can be had without war. But it is certain that no peace without war can be had unless it is a complex state of affairs involving many determinate conditions, operations, and repressions.

Whoever says that, if men would only be rational in times of crisis, wars could be averted is offering more than a remedy for war. If men would only be rational, crisis or no crisis, the millennium would *ipso facto* come into being. Reason is the clue and the instrument by which the possible good may become actual; and *some men* are reasonable. The rewards of the rational will are the charms of philosophy according to the ancient wisdom of poets and prophets. "Until philosophers are kings, cities", says Plato, "will not cease from evil." Coming after Plato we must add—and until all men shall have achieved individually the power and wisdom of philosophy.

To us who are acquainted with the context of such sentiments in Plato and throughout the history of philosophy, this is no canting arrogance. If it be rationalism or intellectualism, as I think it is, it is not therefore indistinguishable from some theories which have borne the name. It is not committed to a *block* universe against which James fulminated. It does not identify the rational with the real, at least not with the determinate real. It does not make a fetish of the rules of formal logic. It does not postulate a finished rational order—"a ghostly ballet of bloodless categories". It merely holds to the belief that the objective order of things lends itself in some measure to the uses of the sustained and rational will of the individual, and that reason is not without prospect of building her house in a world of sticks and stones. It can agree with Peirce that the primal condition of an ordered world is the indeterminate and that order is the work of creative intelligence.

The best of all possible worlds may be more like this one than

⁶ Heraclitus Fr. 43.

we suspect. In any case this world is probably a world in which reason has a chance rather than one in which everything is reasonable. However, I did not set out to find the *best* of all possible worlds but only to consider the possibility of a *better* one. As Plato distinguished a second best state I would distinguish a second best world. The better world is second best. Earth cannot contain it nor heaven give it birth. *It is possible*, and because it is possible it orders the life of a man who, dreaming, thinks; and through him it orders the world. It can never lose itself in the actual because it is a creature of a reasoned life. "Everything", says Peirce, "is possible which does not contradict the laws of reason."

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¹ *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce* VI 366.

AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH TO GOD¹

"THEY parted from one another, the old man and Zarathustra, laughing like schoolboys. When Zarathustra was alone, however, he said to his heart: Could it be possible! This old saint in the forest hath not yet heard that *God is dead!*"

The old saint is specifically described as being in the forest and not at a meeting of the Philosophical Association; here he might not see the forest for the trees. But had he attended these august sessions, he might have gotten wind of the divine demise either from the *argumentum e silentio* or from deprecatory allusions to theologizing philosophers. Rarely, however, would he have found rational consideration of the question whether the God who no longer lives for Zarathustra or for Stalin or for numerous professors, may nevertheless really be alive. Be that as it may, nothing philosophical is foreign to the Philosophical Association, and the problem of God, however it be solved, is philosophical, even though many academic Americans seemed to Norman Kemp Smith to view it as "no longer worthy even of debate". It may be that those who make God a supreme metaphysical principle are right in everything except in what they regard as the main thing. This is the burden of much criticism. But we can hardly assert that the problem of God is now at last so clearly understood that all competent minds confronting the same facts will arrive at the same conclusion about God. Nor can we find in the variety of opinions about God evidence that the problem of God is a pseudo-problem. The popular device of disposing of embarrassing issues by use of this hissing epithet is more commendable as an escape than as a solution. It is conceivable that the current disrepute of philosophy is due in part to philosophers who decline to philosophize. If a thinker fails to build a metaphysic, whether because of intellectual humility, or fear of compromising intellectual honesty by yielding to desire or social pressure, or a conviction that science renders metaphysics superfluous, or any other prompting, nevertheless, pure though his motives be, such a thinker fails to contribute to the clarification of the central problem of phi-

¹ The presidential address to the eastern division of the American Philosophical Association at Cambridge, December 29, 1936.

losophy, namely: What is reality? of which the problem: What is God? is a part.

I

The problem of God is fundamentally metaphysical. That it is also physical, psychological, anthropological, and historical, renders it no less metaphysical. A metaphysical problem must include within its purview all that the sciences can contribute to it, unless metaphysics is a *a priori* incantation without factual basis. But metaphysics is no mere summation of the special sciences, for it deals with the properties of the universe taken as a whole, or of its parts taken in relation to the whole, not with the properties of its parts taken abstractly; and also metaphysics deals, as the special sciences do not, with the problem of evaluation, and hence with perfection. When we speak of God, we are speaking of a supposed being, perfect in some sense, and in some sense dominant in the universe as a whole. God, if there be a God, is a metaphysical object. What is true about God can neither contradict the special sciences, nor yet be derived from them alone.

The idea of God symbolizes a unity or harmony between existence and value; coherence between the structure and function of persons and the structure and function of things; an end for human and for cosmic endeavor, individual and social; a synthesis of mechanism and purpose. It is essentially metaphysical. No study of the psychology or of the history or of the utility or social function of theistic belief, by Christians or Communists, by pragmatists or humanists, is more than a preface to the vital metaphysical question: Is God real or imaginary?

II

Statements that God is, or is not, or is such-and-such, are metaphysical, in that they refer to properties of the Universe as a whole. The question then rises in the mind of anyone accustomed to think empirically whether it is possible to verify any metaphysical proposition, and in particular a proposition about God. This problem of verification has been a central theme of modern philosophy from Hume to the logical positivists. It has not yet been satisfactorily solved. Additional reflections may be tentatively offered for consideration.

First of all, there can be no serious doubt that the idea of God is in need of verification. It cannot be taken with supernatural piety as an intuition or immediate experience so self-evident as to compel the assent of every rational mind without further investigation; or if it can be so taken, there is no cogent necessity for doing it, in view of the large number of thinkers who refuse assent to the idea of God. Norman Kemp Smith, it is true, denies that we can reach the divine merely by way of inference; he rests belief in Divine Existence on immediate experience. Yet how can he deny that the very process of identifying the experience as religious requires inference and verification? And how can he deny that the experience needs interpretation? He is right in holding that mere inference without experience would not prove God, but wrong in implying that mere experience without inference would prove him. Kemp Smith is right in holding that experience of God is necessary to knowledge of God; but, to paraphrase Socrates, an unexamined experience is not worth having. Experience without inference is not verification. The question remains: Is verification of the idea of God possible?

There is more than one kind of verification. Each science has its own concept of verification, which may differ from that used in another science. A mathematician verifies his results by one type of procedure, a physicist by another, an historian by another. Confusion between the kind of verification possible in physiology and that possible in psychology gave rise to extreme behaviorism. It is reasonable to infer that the verification of a metaphysical proposition would in some respects differ from verification in any one of the special sciences. To derive a concept of verification from one field and to clamp it down on all fields is, even when baptized by the sacred name of scientific method, not method, but methodological dogmatism, or methodological chaos. After all, the nature and limits of verification are determined by the nature and limits of the field of investigation. It is therefore to be expected that any conceivable verification of a metaphysical proposition about the whole would differ in some respects from the verification of a scientific proposition about some part of the whole.

Verification of the idea of God, then, would differ from scientific verification. A scientific proposition usually points 'ostensively'

to a particular public object (although the precise meaning of the term 'public' awaits definition) or to a set of such objects; whereas a proposition about God is not primarily concerned with tangible, public 'things'. God cannot be defined ostensively. The more precisely mathematical the formula of a scientific hypothesis is, the more convincing is its verification; but there is no mathematical formula for God, however true it may be that God geometrizes (and if he does no more than geometrize he is not God). The sciences abound in crucial experiments; no crucial experiment has yet been devised for the theistic hypothesis. These and other differences in type of verification derive from the principle that metaphysics lays claim to truth about the whole. If truth about the whole is, as some believe, unattainable, then the unlikenesses between scientific and metaphysical verification prove that all metaphysical propositions are unverifiable. But if propositions about the whole are unavoidable, and if they have bearing on propositions about the parts, it is worth while to inquire further into the problem of metaphysical verification. It is thinkable that the disintegration of metaphysical systems may be due less to the inexorable logic of science than to neglect of metaphysics. Let us see what happens if we try the *Gedankenexperiment* that metaphysics is possible.

Whatever the differences between scientific and metaphysical method, science and metaphysics are alike in that each is a search for truth and each presupposes the rational coherence of truth. There are, accordingly, important likenesses between scientific and metaphysical verification. A first likeness is that all verification must begin and end in the data of the present experience of a verifying person. This is equally true of formal and of factual propositions; of formal, because logical reasoning can be verified only in so far as conscious processes of memory, inference, and purpose, continue; and of factual, because the very meaning of fact is what is actually or possibly present in someone's experience. One may doubt what a person's present experience really is—whether it is what Hume's *Treatise* or Kant's *Critique* or Hegel's *Phenomenology* takes it to be; but one may not rightly doubt that all verification begins and ends in a present personal experience.

A second likeness between scientific and metaphysical verifica-

tion is that each is a type of system. A single immediate experience—if such there be—or a solitary fact verifies nothing. A fact, as an item of present experience, is verificatory only when it stands in relation either to a prior purpose to test some hypothesis or to an insight which perceives an hypothesis simultaneously with the fact. In either case, all verification is a system of purpose, insight, and fact. Unless verification is synoptically apprehended as such a system, the process of verification cannot go on. If purpose fails, or insight is lacking, or fact is not observed, or the interrelation of these factors is obscured, there can be no true verification. The essence of verification, then, in science as well as in metaphysics, is not merely that facts be observed, but rather that systematic relations of facts be perceived.

A third likeness between scientific and metaphysical verification is that both are hypothetical. No hypothesis about the real world can be completely verified until all experience has been surveyed—a manifest impossibility. One hitherto unobserved fact may upset the neatest hypothesis. Our belief that there is an objective world, and our view of what that world is, both rest on postulates which can never be completely verified, and yet which, like all hypotheses, can be tested by their systematic adequacy in organizing all the data. The metaphysician of today cannot rightly lay claim to a Cartesian or Spinozistic certitude; what he can do is to propose a self-consistent hypothesis about experience as a whole, which is at least partially verified by its systematic coherence with given and remembered experience. He can do it, and he must do it, in some way, unless he is either to be content with avoidable vagueness and incoherence in fundamental thinking or else to pin himself down to the here and now. Since here implies there, and now implies then, the second alternative is strictly impossible. We are all metaphysicians of a sort, some of us without knowing it.

III

Having outlined some conditions of verification, let us define the hypothesis that is to be tested, namely, that God is. The proposal to define God evokes with new fury the eternal debate about whether definition can come before investigation. To this debate I beg to add the remark that if definition can come only

at the end of investigation, then it can never come, for investigation is never-ending and investigation can never begin without definition of a problem. I should suppose that it would be inane for any thinker about God to assume that thought began with himself. Investigation and definition have preceded us. But it would be also inane to accept the thought of the past without rethinking its problems. For instance, we cannot accept uncritically the Cartesian definition of God as "an infinite, eternal, immutable, independent substance,—omniscient, omnipotent, and by which I myself and all other things which are (if it is true that other things exist) have been created and produced". Still less can we today rest on Descartes's statement, in reply to Mersenne's objections, "that God is conceived in the same way by everyone, and that all theologians agree on the attributes which they ascribe to him". History shows that the idea of God, like the ideas of matter and of spirit, is undergoing evolution, even though most theologians and some philosophers (including Norman Kemp Smith in 1931) still presuppose the attributes of omnipotence and omniscience.

Granting that the idea of God, like other ideas, is subject to redefinition, criticism, or eventual rejection, we may nevertheless find in the developed religions and philosophies certain elements which are sufficiently constant to be taken as the basis for a tentative definition of God. These elements are: (1) the belief that there is a unified, objective *summum bonum* or supreme value, either as an actual realized being or as a cosmic goal for future realization; (2) the belief that this *summum bonum* is not only final, but efficient, so that in some sense it controls or dominates cosmic process; (3) the belief that the final and efficient aspects are best conceived together by thinking God as a cosmic mind, a rational, purposive experient. Accordingly, God is a supreme cosmic experient, controlling cosmic process, for an end of the highest possible value.

In this definition there occurs the relatively unfamiliar term "experient", which is adopted from James Ward, without implying acceptance of his precise theory. An experient is any actual complex of awareness felt as a whole. It is a unity within itself by virtue of what has well been called its unique togetherness or its self-identity. Momentary experients are usually unified with

previous experients into a larger whole by self-identifying memory-linkages. Thus selves and persons emerge, a self (or whole experient) being any unified whole of momentary experients, and a person being a self capable of experiencing ideal values, *i.e.*, capable of evaluating its valuations. The term experient is intended to designate an indefinite variety of such entities, including the lowest and simplest forms of animal and perhaps of vegetable life, the evanescent experients of certain subconscious processes, the developed experient of experients we call the human self or person, and the supreme experient, God. The hypothesis of experients further posits that experients are in interaction with each other and with non-experiential entities, if such there be.

It is not necessary to complicate our present discussion by raising the issues between and among idealisms and realisms. Whether idealism or realism be true, there are experients interacting with a world. Further, all experients and all entities, as far as we know or imagine, have three properties, which we shall call action, content, and form. In so far as this is a world of interacting process, all of its constituents are active, and in every experient there is the phase of action. In so far as an experient is aware, it must be aware of content—of qualia, essences, subsistents, *sensa*, or whatever one may please to call the immediate content of consciousness. In so far as an experient conforms to law, or is a member of a rational order, or is aware of the rational relations or of ideal values, there is in it the phase of form. An experient, then, is an actual complex of awareness, including content, form, and activity. It always interacts with other experients and the world, although it is often not aware of this interaction as such, nor of the forms implied by its experience.

If God is the supreme experient, his content would include awareness of all qualities in the universe; his form would include all possible relations; and his activity would select from among the qualities those of ideal value and would direct the cosmic process toward their realization.

IV

Is there any reason to suppose that God thus defined is real? Despite the plausibility of the ontological argument, God may very well be imaginary even if the definition of the imaginary

God imagines him to be real. If there is a perfect being, that perfect being must be real. But we have no right to assert that a perfect being is real merely because, if there were such a being, it would have to be real; much less need we assume that our idea of a perfect being is perfect, requiring a perfect cause. Analysis of definitions is not verification. The traditional arguments are so fully committed to the traditional definition of God that they are hardly more than analysis of it. Whether the ontological argument is taken logically (as by Anselm and Descartes) or taken psychologically and held (as by Lotze) to be a sort of instinct for perfection, in either case it is an *a priori* assumption or faith, which lacks the necessity of pure logic and can be treated only as an hypothesis for verification or refutation in accordance with the facts. The cosmological argument, while more empirical in form, requires only *a* world, any world, and at its best is quite irrelevant to the essence of God, namely his control of cosmic process to the end of the highest possible value. As has often been observed, the physico-theological (as Kant called it) is the most satisfactory. It is a genuine move in the direction of empirical verification. Its failure to demonstrate the omnipotent God of the ontological argument, instead of being a defect, as has been supposed, may be a revealing insight into the truth that divine value is not unlimited in power, but has to contend against a cosmic drag. Perhaps the telic activity of the divine experient finds dystelic stuff within the very content of divine experience or in the world divinely experienced and acted on. But the argument as stated historically assumed divine omnipotence and rested on selected evidence, and therefore necessarily lacked sufficient verification. There may be hints or germs of truth in all the ancient proofs, but their strength is not strong enough to prove, as their weakness is not weak enough to refute, the reality of God. A different method is required.

What we need is a genuinely empirical approach to the problem of God; empirical, not in the rigid sense of Hume or the vague sense of Mill, nor yet in the still vaguer sense of much contemporary naturalism (which is as speculative as is idealism), but—to borrow a phrase from the late Mary Whiton Calkins—in the sense of “a truly radical empiricism”. Such an empiricism assumes

that metaphysical truth about the real rests on the personal experience taken as a whole. Not selected *a priori* principles, not special instincts and metaphysical yearnings, not favored intuitions, are the basis of our judgments about metaphysical reality; not even sense-perceptions taken by themselves. These highly reputed items are all no more than items. As mere items they prove nothing about the real; they are problems, not solutions. Personal experience, apprehended as completely as possible, analysed as thoroughly as possible, tested as experimentally as possible, and then grasped synoptically as a system or totality—that is the basis and method of metaphysics. That is the process of all verification. That is the empirical approach to God. If truth about God is to be found, it must be through such an empirical approach. For this approach, reason and experience are not two separate powers, but reason is a function of experience and experience is a movement toward rational totality. The artificial separation of reason and experience, like the similar separation of theory and practice, has wrought much confusion.

The human experient finds himself at birth with plenty of confused data, but no tools of analysis, no methods of experiment, no scientific, philosophical, or religious categories. He is a welter of experience. He has no conception of himself or of a world, although soon enough certain insistent and dependable experiences lead to reliance on external sources of nourishment and relief. A few years go by, and he has become so sure of the objective world that he is impatient of any attempt to discover how he came to be so sure of it. Even if he is a philosopher, his mind may be so littered with *a priori* certainties that he can no longer tolerate the question, Why? Solipsism is absurd, but the thinker may profitably inquire why it is absurd.

The experient who seeks to learn why his experience is not all that there is, has already found reason and hypothesis within experience. 'Why?' means, 'What is the reason?'. His belief that his experience is not all is the hypothesis. In appealing to reason, he is appealing to principles of logical coherence found within his experience, and has acknowledged their normative sway. If he thus appeals to reason, he is thereby freed from the bondage of the egocentric predicament, yet without in the least impugning

the reality or diminishing the importance of the ego, namely, the experient, and without denying its limits. What has freed him is an hypothesis of reason; for only on the hypothesis that there are objective causes for the coming and going of some of his experiences can he give any reasonable account of them. He must either reject reason or affirm a world. But every particular affirmation about the world is hypothetical and open to further inquiry. It is popular in current philosophy to assume epistemological monism and to secure certainty through veridical perception in which idea and object are identical. This is insecure security for readers of Professor A. O. Lovejoy. But even if epistemological monism were true in principle (as it probably is not), in any particular instance of supposed certain and immediate knowledge there would persist the doubt whether this time we were actually in possession of that veridical perception, that immediate experience, which is the true wedlock of idea and object and which alone is to free us from subjectivity. When we are driven from subjectivity, it is not by the compulsion of sheer immediacy. Every intuition is tentative until interpreted. Rational system, as the organization of fact and the court of appeal for all hypotheses, is the basis for assertions about the real objective order. It is by rational system that we are justified in arriving at the conviction that there are other experients and a world.

The thinker who adopts this empirical approach will seek to define his escape from solipsism by imagining and testing a variety of hypothetical rational systems. There is nothing to limit the range of his imagination except the facts of experience and the laws of logic; and neither of these yields a single unambiguous metaphysics. Yet, after the history of thought has produced the known varieties of philosophical theory, it is fair to say that the metaphysical hypothesis which at first glance seems closest to experience is the naturalism which supposes that the spatio-temporal order of processes disclosed by the natural sciences is the only ontological reality. The term naturalism will be taken as referring to this rigid and narrow type. Naturalism has the obvious advantage of ordering our most vivid and obvious experiences, namely, our sense-data.

When we think about the phenomenology of religion—its his-

tory, its sociology, its psychology—from the standpoint of one who has moved in his thought from solipsism to naturalism, we incline to adopt the view of Auguste Comte, or of modern religious humanists, and to identify God with the felt aspirations of the human experient, and particularly with the ideal aspects of social or group activities. This point of view is a marked advance over the standpoint of the old cosmological argument, which is *wertfrei*. Naturalistic humanism is empirical and its God is a final cause. But it is hopeless of finding any relation between final and efficient cause other than accident. The humanist finds value to be real and important; but he is unable to believe that value controls existence, except in man; and man is a cosmic accident. Metaphysically, there is no objective value. While the humanist's naturalism is objective, his axiology is subjective. Having escaped from solipsism in his science and philosophy of nature, he remains a solipsist—at least a social solipsist—in his view of God. If his theory of nature is no less objective for being empirical, it seems that subjectivism is not in principle necessary to his empiricism. His view of God, therefore, cannot be regarded as empirical merely because it is subjective. The most radical empiricist adopts objective hypotheses because these alone give a rational explanation of experience. The same logic which allows the postulation of a natural order impels us to inquire into the postulation of a God. Dogmatic subjectivism is a kind of *ignava ratio*.

Every thinking experient will, in some sense, reach the stage of naturalism. He will accept nature as the space-time order described by the sciences. He will regard that order as extra-experiential in the sense that most of nature is not and never has been or will be present in his own experience or in the experience of all human beings taken together. He will treat that order as non-purposive in the sense that most natural objects do not themselves entertain purposes, and in the sense that purpose (except the purpose to describe) is irrelevant to most scientific description. Finally he will treat that order experimentally as non-unified from the point of view of the autonomy of the sciences. Such a universal naturalism—common to idealists and realists, to naturalists and theists alike—may be called scientific or methodological naturalism. But methodological naturalism is sharply to be distinguished from

metaphysical naturalism. The latter takes the incomplete descriptions and heuristic methods of the former to be either final truth about reality or at least the limits of present human knowledge. Hardly any naturalist of today would be so rash as to take them as final truth. Certainly no man of science would do so; and any philosopher, whether naturalist or theist, cuts a sorry figure when he strikes a dogmatic pose. Accordingly, what is usually done by naturalists is to regard naturalistic descriptions and methods as the limits of knowledge.

Naturalism can be regarded as marking the limits of knowledge only if its methods have taken adequate account of all the data of experience. If knowledge consists of rational hypotheses about experience, tested by their adequacy to account for all of experience, naturalism is perhaps not the fullest knowledge we can discover. This statement will be confirmed if we can find types of experience which naturalism has either neglected or else has accepted without sufficient interpretation. Such are (1) the existence of experients, which is, to say the least, not clearly explained by supposing metaphysical reality to be ultimately spatio-temporal; (2) the tendency in nature toward telic processes; (3) the presence of values in experience; and (4) the relations of disvalues to values.

First, then, there is the existence of experients. The metaphysical problem occasioned by this fact is what might in a less sophisticated age have been called rational psychology, or in the recent past the problem of consciousness. But we have become doubtful about consciousness. James Ward wished to drop the term entirely; William James misleadingly asked, "Does Consciousness Exist?" Many who acknowledge it think it unimportant in comparison with the unconscious or subconscious. Others see in it a powerless epiphenomenon of the physiologically real. It is indeed here, but what of it? Is it not, as given, innocent, neutral, neither mental nor physical? Its undeniable presence is brushed aside as a mere predicament. The extreme behaviorists have denied the undeniable.

Why all this flight from consciousness? What is an empirical age doing when it ignores experients? The point is that the age is more naturalistic than it is empirical. It is surer of its metaphysics

than of its data. Such an age flees consciousness, because consciousness as experienced fact does not fit readily into the hypothetical framework of metaphysical naturalism. If naturalism is strictly true, there really shouldn't be any consciousness at all. Metaphysical naturalism requires its world to be a spatio-temporal system. Within that system there may be as much variety, evolution, and novelty, as natural piety can find, but nothing may transcend the spatio-temporal. In spite of the sincere efforts of able naturalists to solve the problem, consciousness doesn't seem to be what naturalism requires; for naturalism can have only objects or processes in time and space, while consciousness includes in its experience both more and less than time and space. The *Zeitgeist* is perhaps ready for a reaction in favor of the under dog, the conscious experient from which all hypotheses are derived.

Every conscious experient is aware of himself as a temporal process. But every one is more than temporal; for every one transcends time by the 'time span' of the specious present or *durée réelle*, by the experience of memory with recognition, by forward-looking purpose, by awareness of self-identity, and by absorption in some cause, perhaps in God. Every experient is also less than temporal; for every one may subtract from his experienced time by forgetfulness or by sleep. Likewise every conscious experient is aware of spatial relations, but is also aware of experiences which are both more and less than spatial. Less than spatial, for there are moments when the whole awareness of space vanishes or becomes so irrelevant as not to be noticed. More than spatial, because every normal experient is aware of much to which the spatial category does not apply at all, such as logical and many mathematical relations, values, ideals, obligations, and universals, as well as of imaginary and possible spaces quite other than the real space of nature.

No adequate explanation of these more-and-less than spatio-temporal properties of experients is to be found in the properties of a supposed purely spatio-temporal nature, without begging the question. If, for instance, one accepts all these nonspatial and time-transcending properties as properties of spatio-temporal nature, one is commendably empirical, but what has meanwhile

happened to naturalism? The term nature is one of the commonest and vaguest in the current philosophical vocabulary, especially in that of philosophy of religion. But when the generous-hearted naturalist adopts for Mother Nature all the children of consciousness, he can no longer mean by nature a strictly spatio-temporal system; he can mean by it only *X*, the metaphysically real, whatever includes and interprets the temporal and the nontemporal, the spatial and the non-spatial, aspects of being. Naturalism ceases to be a special point of view and becomes identical with the search for truth, synonymous with philosophy. Narrow naturalism gives way to inclusive naturalism. Nature then may remain spatio-temporal, but to the realm of existence may be superadded a realm of essence; or the sturdy old Cartesian or neo-Cartesian dualism may persist, with nature and spirit affirmed side by side, spirit asserting its uniqueness and autonomy so successfully as to obscure the relations of the two autonomous powers, the experients and the spatio-temporal order. The dualist is probably right in asserting interaction; but his rightness about interaction does not dispense with his need either of the pineal gland or else of some more illuminating basis for interaction. Meanwhile naturalism has lost its rigid and narrow meaning.

The existence of experients with their nontemporal and non-spatial properties is a stubborn fact. When that fact is taken fully into account naturalism either loses its old rigidity while its strictly spatio-temporal framework melts into process, or else it has to be content with a division of the spoils and take only half of some dualism. Either alternative is a recognition of the unique properties of experients and so of the reality of processes in the universe which are not exclusively spatio-temporal. Accordingly, recognition of the existence of experients is one step, although a short one, in the empirical approach to theism. If the world of sense-objects is the only world and the whole world, the case against theism is closed. If experience reveals additional data, then theism is empirically possible. The theistic hypothesis is not thereby verified; but it is left standing if experients consist of more than sense-data and reasoning processes.

The second sort of evidence which naturalism has underestimated is the tendency in nature toward telic processes. The

empirical evidence here is of three main sorts. Nature (using the term now as designating the metaphysical *X*), in the first place, tends to produce beings having foresight or conscious purpose, such as human experients, the apes studied by Koehler, and numerous other animals. In the second place, nature tends to produce unconscious telic processes in connection with organic life. The attempt to explain 'instincts' and other telic processes as due to natural selection and the survival of the fittest is successful, but irrelevant, for it totally ignores an important metaphysical question, namely: What is the constitution of the real that causes any organisms to be produced that are fit to survive? No adequate rigidly naturalistic answer has been given to this old problem of the arrival of the fit. In the third place, there are empirically observable telic tendencies in inorganic nature—such as the processes which result in the beautiful in rivers, oceans, mountains, and landscapes, and the sublime in the starry heavens above. Wholes are formed which have significant structure and function; for naturalism they are accidental.

What of all these processes? They are the data on which the old physico-theological argument relied; they are familiar facts. But a naturalist like Professor Sidney Hook might admit them all, while denying that they point to any unified cosmic or metaphysical purpose such as theism posits. The choice between the naturalistic hypothesis of accident and the theistic hypothesis of conscious purpose cannot be decided by any crucial experiment. Meanwhile naturalists live as if there were an ideal purpose in life and even a cosmic reason; and theists live as if the spatio-temporal order afforded experimental knowledge. Practice cannot solve the problem. The telic facts are structures of actual experience, crying for interpretation. From the point of view of empirical theory, naturalism is in the position of having to explain away the telic facts, whereas theism is in the position of interpreting them. For naturalism, these facts are metaphysical illusions, irrelevant accidents; for theism, they are signs of a unitary metaphysical reality. The metaphysics of theism is in this respect actually more empirical than that of naturalism; it 'saves the appearances' more completely.

The third type of evidence insufficiently considered by natural-

ism is the presence of values. By values are meant, first of all, desires. Even this elementary experience of value is more difficult for naturalism than is commonly supposed, for desire is a process in an experient and it is a telic process. But values involve at least two facts beyond desires. In the first place, ideal values are not mere desires, but are desires rationally criticized and interpreted. They are normative evaluations. It is a fact, then, not merely that experients desire but also that they are capable of criticizing and organizing desire in accordance with rational ideals of truth and goodness, beauty and holiness. In the second place, it is a fact that experients who reject solipsism believe that the metaphysical *X* is the cause and support of these ideal values. This belief reduced to its lowest terms means that nature is the actual basis for the origin and realization of these ideals. Nature is thus interpreted as being, among other things, an originator and supporter of ideal values. The theistic conception of nature as the telic activity of a cosmic experient takes due account of these facts about value. The naturalistic conception of nature as the changing patterns of an atelic spatio-temporal structure takes only belated and incidental account of the value-facts. The naturalist is usually a practical idealist who declines to consider his own idealism as part of the evidence about the kind of universe this is. Many of the debates which have shaken religious faith—especially debates about science and religion—have been irrelevant because they have totally ignored the main question, namely, the question of value, to which Bertrand Russell has partially awakened in his *Religion and Science*. Theism is a more empirical attempt to deal with it than is naturalism.

One particular type of value is especially difficult for naturalism. I mean the mystical. Lutoslawski regards it as the only evidence for God. For those who attain the mystical experience, it utterly transcends all other values. At the same time it is the supreme unity of all values, for it is a direct consciousness of the source of all values. In spite of being the supreme value, it lays no claim to exclusiveness. The greatest mystics have never supposed that the mystical experience could or should always be present or always be sought or that its value was solely the intrinsic one of contemplation. On the contrary, they have seen in it an exaltation

and refreshment of the spirit in preparation for the ordinary tasks of life. As in the *Bhagavadgita* Krishna tells Arjuna to "cast off this base weakness of heart and arise", even to the extent of participating in battle, so in the gospels Jesus leads the disciples from the ecstasy of the Mount of Transfiguration to psychotherapeutic treatment of an epileptic in the valley. A study of the moral and social fruits of mysticism doubtless reveals many abuses and errors of judgment, but also reveals the creation or the strengthening of desire to participate practically in the lifting of human society to higher levels. St. Paul and Mohammed, Joan of Arc and Savonarola, George Fox and Henry Thoreau, Gandhi and Kagawa, may all have been guilty of errors in judgment. Nevertheless in them all, as in most normal mystics, the *unio mystica* gives birth to an impulse toward social values so lofty that they may well be part of the cosmic purpose of a God.

Mystical experience is a fact of profound significance in the empirical approach to God. But it is wrong to regard it as a sufficient and sole basis for that approach. Even though the mystic ecstasy be an intrinsic value, the belief that this value is also an immediate perception of a metaphysical truth about God is not sufficiently verified by the ecstasy. Even though the mystical experience is led to practical social conduct, his belief that his conduct is the will of God is not sufficiently verified by the pragmatic consequences. Intrinsic ecstasy and extrinsic consequences are both items demanding consideration, but a truly empirical verification or correction of the metaphysical beliefs which they imply must take into account their relations to other experiences and their place in the whole.

For this reason the attack on mysticism which has been made with great brilliance by Professor J. H. Leuba suffers from the same logical defect as does uncritical trust in the immediate deliverances of the mystical moment, namely, the defect of neglecting relations. Professor Leuba has pointed out that certain drugs produce experiences psychologically indistinguishable from those of mysticism. But that fact can be used to undermine confidence in mysticism only by neglecting relations. If the drug-experience not only produced the ecstasy and the ideal social striving of the mystical experience, but also served to unify and render coherent

and intelligible the functioning of experience as a whole, there would be no good reason to doubt that the drug-experience led to a veridical perception of God. But, until judged by these criteria, the structural similarity of the drug-experience to genuine mysticism is no stronger argument against the mystic's insight into God than the ecstasy of the mystic is for such insight. Both arguments rest on a logical atomism which is inconsistent with a rational radical empiricism because it neglects wider relations.

The fourth set of facts neglected by naturalism consists of the situations of conflict between value and disvalue, or good and evil, which are present throughout experience. These facts give rise to what is commonly called the problem of evil. The usual attitude of naturalism toward these facts and the problem which they occasion is that of practical action combined with metaphysical indifference. In the presence of the conflict between values and facts more or less incompatible with their realization, every rational being who is not a fatalist or a quietist is impelled to action that will increase the values and diminish the disvalues in human experience. This action and its limits furnish the stuff of human history, of literature, of the arts, and of religion. Now for a naturalist not only the struggles of the idealizing human spirit with circumstance, but also the signs of cosmic purpose and of resistance to purpose, are metaphysically irrelevant. For him, evil is a matter of course, not a metaphysical problem. The naturalist follows the fashion of the day and makes his way evasively around the problem of evil instead of through it. For him, neither good nor evil is metaphysically significant. Good and evil are subjective epiphenomena in man, not signs of cosmic purpose or cosmic struggle. But the human spirit ought not to be satisfied with the way around any real problem. The most naïve believer in gods and devils, spirits, satans, and imps, is more realistic, if less philosophical, than the naturalist who believes that the whole drama of good and evil has no objective import and who discerns no metaphysical problem in that whole area of experience. It is evasive to say that the problem is artificially created by the belief in a good God. The problem is given in the conflicts of experience.

Theism, it is true, has not historically held to any single solution of the problem of evil; but it has made serious and successful

efforts to cope with it, whereas naturalism has passed it by completely as a theoretical problem. One may somewhat arbitrarily classify the chief theistic solutions as being either absolutistic or finistic. The absolutistic solution is either of the Hegelian type, which views evil as included and transcended in the whole, or of the traditional theistic type, which regards all apparent evil as serving some good end that may be known only to the absolute and omnipotent creator. The finitistic solution may be either palaeo-Christian, ascribing evil to the devil, the prince of the powers of the air, a rival of God; or it may be Platonic (or neo-Cartesian), holding to some eternal matter or nonbeing with which the divine will contends; or else it may be personalistic, conceiving the divine experient as including within his own consciousness both a creative will for value and also an experience of limits, both rational and nonrational in kind. Any of these solutions is intellectually more adequate than the naturalistic refusal to treat the problem seriously. Natural piety which accepts facts without interpreting them becomes rational impiety. It betrays the cause of empiricism.

V

Theism, as we have seen, takes cognizance of types of fact which narrow naturalism circumambulates or misinterprets. Theism may thus be regarded as an inclusive naturalism. From this it does not follow that theism is necessarily true. There are alternative hypotheses which I am not now considering. In no event can one maintain that theism is susceptible of complete empirical verification, much less of *a priori* demonstration. Descartes' statements, in the Fourth Part of the *Discours* and in the Dedication of the *Méditations*, that the existence of God is at least as certain as any demonstration of geometry are valid only in the innocuous sense that, if you assume the proper postulates, theism is necessarily implied by them. The sooner all claims of *a priori* necessity for any metaphysics are dropped, the clearer the philosophical air will be.

Theism, taken as an hypothesis about the rational interpretation of experience as a whole, is subject to empirical verification, modification, or eventual rejection, like any other metaphysical

hypothesis. That there may be some *a priori* metaphysical truths highly general in nature, I grant. What I have denied is that the belief in an objectively real, value-seeking God is such a truth. What I have asserted is that there is an empirical basis for the hypothesis that such a God is real, and that the basis for theism is empirically ampler and rationally more coherent than that for solipsism or naturalism.

But it is more important for religion to consider what God is than to demonstrate that he is. The question thus arises whether the empirical approach suggests any important change in the traditional idea of God. The traditional view has been of the type that has just been described as absolutistic. God's omnipotence, absoluteness, and infinity, have been among his most obvious and fundamental attributes for St. Thomas, for Descartes, and for many modern philosophers of religion. And there are certain senses in which one must, on rational grounds, view God as infinite if one adopts the hypothesis of God at all. As regards time, God must be of infinite duration, unbegun and unending; as regards goodness, God must be infinite, never failing in devotion to the highest ideals. But is it equally necessary to assume that God is infinite in power? Since Epicurus, theistic thought has been caught in a dilemma between the power and the goodness of God. It has been commonly assumed that if one denies the omnipotence of God, one denies God's very being, or at least his religious significance. One who questions the omnipotence of God is told by one's philosophical barber, 'Then he ain't supreme'. Can the empirical approach shed light on the historic problem of the power of goodness?

The empirical evidence most directly relevant to the cosmic fate of values, and hence to the power of goodness in objective reality, is to be found in the facts of evolution—both celestial and terrestrial. Astronomy gives us the former, biology the latter. An impartial contemplation of the data of evolution leaves a dual impression of ineradicable teleology and ineradicable dysteleology. There is ineradicable teleology. The order, mutual adaptation, and progress in evolution, above all the so-called 'arrival of the fit', point to a power other than the curve of probability, arriving at relevance, wholeness, and value. To deny this is to appeal to magic.

But with the teleology, there is ineradicable dysteleology. The incalculable wastage, the blind alleys, the internecine warfare, the natural plagues and disasters, of the evolutionary process are empirically ineradicable evidence of dysteleology. If the dysteleological facts are disposed of, as many theists would dispose of them, by appeal to human ignorance of the Absolute will of the Almighty, then by the same logic the teleological facts have also been disposed of. If we do not know enough to judge that an evil is an evil, then we do not know enough to judge that a good is a good. The logic of theistic absolutism may be thus used as well to support atheism as to support omnipotence. The absolutist does well to remind the empiricist of the limits of human knowledge; but he in turn should be reminded that from our ignorance no concrete metaphysical truth can be inferred, certainly not the proposition that God's in his heaven, all's right with the world. He also should be reminded that metaphysical truth must include the truth of all the appearances. To deny the finality of appearances is not to deny the relevance of any appearances to reality.

Treading now the humbler empirical pathway and leaving the empyrean to the wings of the absolutist, we may discover grounds for the hypothesis of a finite God, shorn of the old attribute of omnipotence. The cosmic energy seems to be a purposive power contending with purposeless materials; in every moment of the evolutionary process there seem to be active purpose, rational law, and irrational content. Considerations such as I have urged against naturalism lead to the hypothesis that this purposive power is a cosmic experient. The active purpose, the rational law, and the irrational content, which are inherent in every human experient, in the evolutionary process, and in every real process or object, are compatible with the hypothesis that the cosmic process is the development of a cosmic experient. This hypothesis interprets the cosmic drama of good and evil. The traditional view of God, therefore, was right in so far as it implied that the will of God confronts eternal *vérités de raison*. But the will or active and purposive principle of the cosmos also confronts *vérités de fait*. Let us call whatever is not an act or product of the will of God by the name of The Given. God is finite, I hold, not in the sense that The Given is ultimately external to him, as a devil or Platonic

matter, but in the sense that his will is limited by formal and factual conditions eternally given within his experience, conditions which that will did not produce. Such a God is empirically revealed in the evolutionary process. An omnipotent and absolutely infinite God could be revealed only to an *a priori* faith. Norman Kemp Smith's reliance on Hume's Philo for proof that a limited God can meet the needs neither of religion nor of theology, errs not only by regarding supposed religious need as a criterion of truth, but also by exploring insufficiently the hypothesis of a finite God and its religious value.

The concept of a finite God has appeared in various forms in the history of thought, more frequently of late. The tendency of contemporary philosophy of religion is to adopt a dualistic or pluralistic view of what I have called The Given, rather than seeing it as internal to the very structure of the cosmic experient. This is a gain in religious dignity, but a loss in empirical coherence. It is due to an attempt to retain for God the telic facts, while casting the dystelic facts into outer darkness. A more coherent view will either eliminate God entirely or will recognize the fact of complex structure and struggle within God. But when God is eliminated he soon reappears in some other form, Superman or Proletariat. Empirical thinkers may well find a finite God to be the most comprehensive hypothesis for the interpretation of all the facts.

If God be inferred from our observations of the physical order, the psychological order, and the ideal order, then God must be such as to unify and explain the data of these three orders. Existence, consciousness, and subsistence, inextricably related in reality, fall apart in some great philosophical systems into separate universes. What man has put asunder, say the system-makers, let not God join together. But God has joined them together in every experient as content, action, and form. The hypothesis that God too is an experient, whose action is limited by the content and by the possibilities of subsistence which he finds within himself as experient, accounts for the structure of our own experience, which in the end is the sole touchstone of truth.

The majority of my hearers doubtless think that it is too bold to allow the empirical approach to be guided by the hypothesis

of God. Perhaps, then, someone will explain just where boldness should end. Is it humble to accept naturalism, bold to accept God? Is an hypothesis which minimizes part of the facts less bold than one which is more inclusive? Is it humble to ascribe the origin of value to man or to matter, bold to ascribe it to God? It were indeed bold to assert that the theism proposed in this address is the only possible metaphysic. But only he who is bold enough to venture hypotheses which carry him beyond selected facts to all the facts, and beyond all brute facts as experienced to their interpretation and use, is likely to move in the direction of the truth which all philosophy seeks. One may purchase certainty by omitting perplexing facts; but a certainty purchased at the expense of fact may gain knowledge and lose sight of the goal of truth. Again, a humility which restricts its utterances to the results of scientific investigation may gain exactness while losing comprehensiveness and openness to reality. Science does not raise the problem of value or the problem of God. If philosophy does not raise these problems and attempt to solve them, it might well be humble enough to give up the ghost entirely and leave the field to science. Faint heart never won fair Lady Truth.

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WHITEHEAD'S PHILOSOPHY¹

MR. WHITEHEAD'S philosophy is so comprehensive that it invites discussion from a number of points of view. One may consider one of the many special topics he has treated with so much illumination or one may choose for discussion his basic method. Since the latter point is basic and since it seems to me to present his enduring contribution to philosophy, I shall confine myself to it.

Mr. Whitehead says that the task of philosophy is to frame "descriptive generalizations of experience". In this, an empiricist should agree without reservation. Descriptive generalization of experience is the goal of any intelligent empiricism. Agreement upon this special point is the more emphatic because Mr. Whitehead is not afraid to use the term "immediate experience". Although he calls the method of philosophy that of Rationalism, this term need not give the empiricist pause. For the historic school that goes by the name of Rationalism (with which empiricism is at odds) is concerned not with *descriptive* generalization, but ultimately with *a priori* generalities from which the matter of experience can itself be derived. The contrast between this position and Mr. Whitehead's stands out conspicuously in his emphasis upon immediately existent actual entities. "These actual entities", he says, "are the final real things of which the world is made up. There is no going behind actual entities. They are the only *reasons* for anything." The divergence is further emphasized in the fact that Whitehead holds that there is in every real occasion a demonstrative or denotative element that can only be pointed to: namely, the element referred to in such words as 'this, here, now, that, there, then'; elements that cannot be derived from anything more general and that form, indeed, the subject-matter of one of the main generalizations, that of real occasions itself.²

Mr. Whitehead's definition of philosophy was, however, just given in an abbreviated form. The descriptive generalizations, he goes on to say, must be such as to form "a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element

¹ Read to the eastern division of the American Philosophical Association in the symposium on Whitehead's philosophy, December 29, 1936.

² *Process and Reality* 27 and 37.

of our experience may be interpreted. Here 'interpretation' means that each element shall have the character of a particular instance of a general scheme."³ The wording of this passage suggests a point of view nearer to that of traditional Rationalism than the conception just set forth. If it means that philosophers should proceed as logically as possible, striving to present findings that are coherent, that are even 'necessary', if the necessity in question be that of close-knit relation to one another without omissions and superfluities in the generalized descriptions of experience that are obtained, the empiricist need not dissent. The statement is, however, open to another interpretation, and to that I shall later return.

I first wish to dwell upon the complete extension of Mr. Whitehead's conception of 'experience'. It is customary to find the application of the term confined to human and even to conscious experience. Denial of this restriction is fundamental in Mr. Whitehead's thought. Everything that characterizes human experience is found in the natural world. Conversely, what is found in the natural world is found in human experience. Hence the more we find out about the natural world, the more intellectual agencies we have for analysing, describing, and understanding human experience. We cannot determine the constituents of the latter by staring at it directly, but only by interpreting it in terms of the natural world that is experienced.

The completeness of the correspondence between the elements of human experience and of nature is exemplified in each one of Whitehead's ultimate generalizations. I mention five of these correspondences by way of illustration. (1) Change is such a marked trait of conscious experience that the latter has been called, rather intemperately, a mere flux. Every actual entity in the universe is in process; in some sense *is* process. (2) No two conscious experiences exactly duplicate one another. Creativity and novelty are characteristic of nature. (3) Conscious experience is marked by retention—memory in its broadest sense—and anticipation. Nature also carries on. Every actual occasion is prehensive of other occasions and has objective immortality in its successors. (4) Every conscious experience involves a focus which is the centre of a

³ P.R. 4; *Adventures of Ideas* 285.

determinate perspective. This principle is exemplified in nature. (5) Every conscious experience is a completely unitary pulse in a continuous stream. The continuity of nature includes atomicity and individualizations of the ongoing stream.

I do not mean to imply that Whitehead arrived at the generalizations, of which those just cited are examples, by instituting *directly* such a set of one-to-one similarities. But unless I have completely misread him, the correspondences are there and are fundamental in his method and his system. As he himself says: "Any doctrine that refuses to place human experience outside nature must find in the description of experience factors which enter also into the description of less specialized natural occurrences. . . . We should either admit dualism, at least as a provisional doctrine, or we should point out the identical elements connecting human experience with physical science."⁴

I now turn to the other aspect of the correspondence: the utilization of the results of natural science as means of interpreting human experience. A noteworthy example is found in his treatment of the subject-object relation. In this treatment, it stands out most clearly that his denial of bifurcation is not a special epistemological doctrine but runs through his whole cosmology. The subject-object relation is found in human experience and in knowledge because it is fundamentally characteristic of nature. Philosophy has taken this relation to be fundamental. With this, Whitehead agrees. But it has also taken this relation to be one of a knower and that which is known. With this, he fundamentally disagrees. In every actual occasion the relation is found; each occasion is subject for itself and is reciprocally object for that which 'provokes' it to be what it is in its process. The interplay of these two things "is the stuff constituting those individual things that make up the sole reality of the Universe". There are revolutionary consequences for the theory of experience and of knowledge involved in this view of the subject-object relation.

I select, as illustration of these consequences, the relation of his philosophy to the idealism-realism problem. Simplifying the matter, idealism results when the subject-object relation is confined to knowledge and the subject is given primacy. Realism results when the object is given primacy. But if every actual occasion is

⁴ *A.I.* 237.

'bipolar' (to use Mr. Whitehead's own expression) the case stands otherwise. The terms 'real' and 'ideal' can be used only in abstraction from the actual totalities that exist. When we talk about the physical and the psychical as if there were objects which are exclusively one or the other, we are, if we only know what we are about, following, and in an over-specialized way, the historic routes by which a succession of actual occasions become enduring objects of specified kinds. Nor are these routes confined to institution of just two kinds of objects. Some are in the direction of those objects that are called electrons; some in that of astronomic systems; some in that of plants or animals; some in that of conscious human beings. The differences in these objects are differences in historic routes of derivation and hereditary transmission; they do not present fixed and untraversable gulfs. (I am obliged to omit reference to the complementary principle of societies or communities of these objects.)

I give one further illustration, without comment, in Mr. Whitehead's own words. "The brain is continuous with the body, and the body is continuous with the rest of the natural world. Human experience is an act of self-origination including the whole of nature, limited to the perspective of a focal region within the body, but not necessarily persisting in any fixed coördination with a definite part of the brain."⁵ Just one more illustration will be given of the use of the findings of physical science in analysis of human experience. I do not see how anyone not familiar with modern field-theories in physics and who did not have the courage of imagination to apply these theories to the descriptive generalization of human experience could have arrived at many of the conclusions about the latter which Whitehead has reached: I mention, as a special example, the fallacy of simple location.

I have selected, I repeat, a few points in order to illustrate the method which to me is his original and enduring contribution to philosophy, present and future. I should be glad to continue in this strain, and to suggest how the results of this method, were it widely adopted, would assuredly take philosophy away from by-paths that have led to dead-ends and would release it from many constraints that now embarrass it. But I must return to that aspect of his thought which seems to imply that, after all, his

⁵ *A.I.* 290.

method is to be understood and applied in a direction which assimilates it, with enormous development in matters of detail, to traditional Rationalism. I say '*seems*'; for it is a question I am raising. The issue in brief is this: Is it to be developed and applied with fundamental emphasis upon experimental observation (the method of the natural sciences)? Or does it point to the primacy of mathematical method, in accord with historic rationalism? I hope the word 'primacy' will be noted. This occasion is a highly inappropriate one in which to introduce bifurcation. The two directions are not opposed to each other. Mathematics has its own established position in physical science. But I do not see how the two can be co-ordinate, meaning by 'co-ordinate' being upon exactly the same level. One, I think, must lead and the other follow.

A mathematical logician proceeds, if I understand the matter aright, in some such way as the following. He finds in existence a definite body of mathematical disciplines. The existence in question is historical. In so far, the disciplines are subject to the contingencies that affect everything historical. Compared, therefore, with the requirements of logical structure, there is something *ad hoc* about them as they stand. The logician has then a double task to perform. He has to reduce each discipline to the smallest number of independent definitions and postulates that are sufficient and necessary to effect logical organization of the subject-matter of that discipline. He has also to bring the various definitions and postulates of the different branches of mathematics into coherent and necessary relation to one another. There is something in the extended definition of philosophy, which was quoted earlier, that suggests that Whitehead would have us adopt such a mathematical model and pattern in philosophizing. On this basis a philosopher would set himself the aim of discovering in immediate experience the elements that can be stated in a succinct system of independent definitions and postulates, they being such that when they are deductively woven together there will result a coherent and necessary system in which "each element shall have the character of a particular instance of the general scheme". In this case, it is not simply the philosopher who must proceed logically. The scheme of nature and immediate experience is itself a logical system—when we have the wit to make it out in its own terms.

Nevertheless, that which I have called Whitehead's basic method is capable of another construction. As far as experience-nature and descriptive generalizations are concerned, there is an alternative method open: that which I called that of the natural rather than the mathematical sciences. For in the former, while mathematical science is indispensable, it is subordinate to the consequences of experimental observational inquiry. For brevity I shall call this contrasting method 'genetic-functional', though I am aware that 'genetic' in particular is exposed to serious misapprehension.⁶ Upon the mathematical model, the resulting generalizations, it seems to me, are necessarily morphological and static; they express an aboriginal structure, the components of which are then deductively woven together. Upon the basis of the other model, the subject-matter of the generalizations is distinctions that arise in and because of inquiry into the subject-matter of experience-nature, and they then function or operate as divisions of labor in the further control and ordering of its materials and processes.

As far as method is concerned, the only opposite I can find for 'genetic' is 'intuitional'. Generalized distinctions are there ready-made, so to speak, and after analysis has taken place, we just see and acknowledge them by a kind of rational perception which is final. The opposite of 'functional' is, of course, 'structural'. Somehow, when put together rightly, the various generalizations represent different parts of a fixed structure; they are like morphological organs when these are viewed in abstraction from differentiations of functioning activity. Thus we are led back to the question: Which aspect is primary and leading and which is auxiliary?

Adequate discussion of this issue would demand consideration of each one of Whitehead's ultimate generalities or categories, there being at least seven of them.⁷ Time forbids such consideration. I confine myself to the position of 'eternal objects'. The fact that the word 'ingression' is constantly used to designate their relation to actual entities suggests quite strongly the mathematical

⁶ Such misapprehension will occur if the idea of genesis is taken to be of a psychological order. It is meant in an objective sense, the sense in which the origin and development of astronomical systems and of animals is genetics.

⁷ In *Adventures of Ideas*, these are connected, with appropriate modifications, with the Platonic scheme. See pp. 188, 203, 240, and 354.

model. For ingression suggests an independent and ready-made subsistence of eternal objects, the latter being guaranteed by direct intuition. The conception of God in the total system seems to indicate that this is the proper interpretation, since some principle is certainly necessary, upon this premise, to act selectively in determining what eternal objects ingress in any given immediate occasion. The alternative view is that of the egression of natures, characters, or universals, as a consequence of the necessity of generalization from immediate occasions that exists in order to direct their further movement and its consequences. This capacity of intelligence performs the office for which Deity has to be invoked upon the other premise.

Upon the genetic-functional view, such objects (which are 'eternal' in the sense of not being spatio-temporal existences) emerge because of the existence of problematic situations. They emerge originally as suggestions. They are then operatively applied to actual existences. When they succeed in resolving problematic situations (in organizing otherwise conflicting elements) they part with some or most of their hypothetical quality and become routine methods of behavior.

Upon the basis of the generalized idea of experience of Whitehead, there is something corresponding to this in nature. There exist in nature indeterminate situations. Because of their indeterminate nature, the subsequent process is hesitant and tentative. The activity that is 'provoked' is incipient. If it becomes habitual, it is finally determinately egressive as a routine of nature, and it harmonizes the aggressively conflicting elements to which is due the indeterminacy of the original natural situation. When this routine-established mode of processive activity is observed it becomes the subject-matter of a natural law.

I am not affirming positively that this way of interpreting the basic conception of experience and the relations of its generalized descriptions to one another is necessary. It does decidedly appear to me to be a genuine alternative way. While my own preference is markedly in *its* favor, I am presenting it, as I have already said, for the purpose of presenting and making clear, as far as limits of time permit, a question.⁸ Upon the negative side, the absence

⁸The point of the choice between alternatives would be clearer still if there were time to discuss immediate qualities (usually called *sensory*

of any attempt in Mr. Whitehead's writings to place the ultimate generalities in any scheme of analytic-genetic derivation points to his adoption of what I have called the mathematical pattern. Upon the positive side there is the rather complex intermediary apparatus of God, harmony, mathematical relations, natural laws, that is required to effect the interweaving of eternal objects and immediate occasions. I do not think that the difficulties found in reading Mr. Whitehead are due to his fundamental conception of experience. On the contrary, given a reasonable degree of emancipation of philosophic imagination from philosophic tradition and its language, that idea seems to me extraordinarily luminous as well as productive. The difficulties seem to me to arise from the intermediary apparatus required in the interweaving of elements; the interweaving being required only because of the assumption of original independence and not being required if they emerge to serve functionally ends which experience itself institutes.

Because Whitehead's philosophy is fraught with such potentialities for the future of the philosophizing of all of us, I have raised the question of basic method, instead of limiting myself to the more congenial task of selecting some one of its many suggestive developments for special comment. As currents of philosophy are running at present, it is altogether likely that its immediate influence will be mainly upon the side of what I called the mathematical model. Its enduring influence in behalf of the integrated Naturalism to which Whitehead is devoted seems to me to demand the other interpretation. There is, without doubt, a certain irony in giving to Mr. Whitehead's thought a mathematical interpretation, for that implies, after all, the primacy of the static over process, the latter, upon this interpretation, being limited to immediate occasions and their secondary reactions back into what is fixed by nature; as in the case of the change in Primordial God. The plea, then, for the alternative direction of development of his thought is in essence a plea for recognizing the infinite fertility of actual occasions in their full actuality.

JOHN DEWEY

because of one of their causal conditions) which Whitehead regards as eternal objects; for upon the other theory they are just what gives actual occasions their unique singularity, so that there is no actual entity without them.

REMARKS*

YOUR choice of my philosophic outlook as a topic for discussion is an honor for which I am deeply grateful. Your action is characteristic of the generous warmth of your countrymen. A group of American philosophers provides the best instrument for that sincere, critical discussion which is one essential feature in philosophic advance.

Philosophy in its advance must involve obscurity of expression, and novel phrases. The permanent, essential factors governing the nature of things lie in the dim background of our conscious experience—whether it be perceptual or conceptual experience. The variable factors first catch our attention, and we survive by reason of our fortunate adjustment of them. Language has been evolved to express 'clearly and distinctly' the accidental aspect of accidental factors. But no factor is wholly accidental. Everything which in any sense is something thereby expresses its dependence on those ultimate principles whereby there are a variety of existences and of types of existences in the connected universe.

Thus the task of philosophy is to penetrate beyond the more obvious accidents to those principles of existence which are presupposed in dim consciousness, as involved in the total meaning of seeming clarity. Philosophy asks the simple question, What is it all about?

In human experience, the philosophic question can receive no final answer. Human knowledge is a process of approximation. In the focus of experience there is comparative clarity. But the discrimination of this clarity leads into the penumbral background. There are always questions left over. The problem is to discriminate exactly, what we know vaguely.

The endeavor to make our utmost approximation to analysis of meaning is human philosophy. For a being with complete knowledge, philosophy would take another aspect. He might say, 'Knowing everything, I will fix attention on this detail'. He will then enjoy the detail in its relation to the discriminated totality.

We enjoy the detail as a weapon for the further discrimination

* Read before the eastern division of the American Philosophical Association in the symposium on Whitehead's philosophy at Cambridge, December 29, 1936.

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of the penumbral totality. In our experience there is always the dim background from which we derive and to which we return. We are not enjoying a limited dolls' house of clear and distinct things, secluded from all ambiguity. In the darkness beyond there ever looms the vague mass which is the universe begetting us.

The besetting sin of philosophers is that, being merely men, they endeavor to survey the universe from the standpoint of gods. There is a pretense at adequate clarity of fundamental ideas. We can never disengage our measure of clarity from a pragmatic sufficiency within occasions of ill-defined limitations. Clarity always means 'clear enough'.

With this preamble, we now turn to the papers read this afternoon. It is out of place to discuss them in detail at the close of this session. They will remain in my mind as a landmark for future thought. Also, where they indicate difficulties, I am in general agreement as to the need of clarification or revision in my written works. Of course you will not expect an adequate exposition of philosophy in thirty minutes.

John Dewey asks me to decide between the 'genetic-functional' interpretation of first principles and the 'mathematical-formal' interpretation. There is no one from whom one more dislikes to differ, than from Dewey. William James and John Dewey will stand out as having infused philosophy with new life, and with a new relevance to the modern world. But I must decline to make this decision. The beauty of philosophy is its many facets. Our present problem is the fusion of the two interpretations. The historic process of the world, which requires the genetic-functional interpretation, also requires for its understanding some insight into those ultimate principles of existence which express the necessary connections within the flux.

For example, there are meaningful relations between these ten fingers, and the billions of stars, and the innumerable billions of atoms. The interrelations of the specific multiplicities of groups of individual things constitute the clearest example of metaphysical necessity issuing in meaningful relations amid the accidents of history. No explosion of any star can generate the multiplication-table by any genetic-functioning. But such functioning does exemplify interrelations of number. It is necessary that the meaning of

the explosion be partly expressed by arithmetic. This necessity underlies the accidents of the explosion.

By a queer chance in this epoch of the universe arithmetical patterns constitute some of the clearest insights of human intelligence. There are limits to this clarity. But such as it is, we teach it to infants. Metaphysical knowledge enters while we still remember the rocking cradle. The notion of 'many things' carries with it the necessity that there be numbers. And yet there is no necessity that any special relationship of numbers be in any one instance exemplified. In this way we can observe the curious interweaving of accident and necessity.

The notion of 'many things' is a slippery one. There are these ten fingers and there are the ten commandments. In what sense do these fingers and the ten commandments together constitute twenty things? We are here brought up against the difficulty of the subtle change of meaning in familiar notions according to the context in which they occur.

The vagueness of our insight prevents our exact understanding of the metaphysical basis of particular exemplification. For this reason our metaphysical notions are an approximation. They represent such disengagement of necessity from accident as we are able to attain. One illustration of this approximate character of metaphysical knowledge is that such knowledge is always haunted by alternatives which we reject. Now necessity permits no alternatives. A century ago, arithmetic as then understood seemed to exclude alternatives. Today, the enunciation of ultimate arithmetic principles is beset with perplexities, and is the favorite occupation of opposing groups of dogmatists. We have not yet arrived at that understanding of arithmetical principles which exhibits them as devoid of alternatives.

Plato's ultimate forms, which are for him the basis of all reality, can be construed as referring to the metaphysical necessity which underlies historic accident. In the case of his immediate successors, the superior lucidity of arithmetic insight triumphed. The result was that the Academy after his death tended to identify the forms with arithmetic notions. Indeed the Academy and subsequent European philosophers went further. They saw in Euclidean Geometry another example of necessity. We now know

that they were wrong. The continual breakdown of pretensions to the achievement of final metaphysical truth is pathetic. But, on the other side, the persistent presupposition of final principles cannot be neglected by any philosopher who counts himself as a 'radical empiricist'. For example, to take John Dewey's language in his paper which is spread before me, the compound word 'genetic-functional' means an ultimate metaphysical principle from which there is no escape. I am here in complete agreement with Dewey. The idea is vague, and adumbrates something beyond exact definition. This vagueness arises because Plato and Dewey are men with the limitations of human insight.

This notion of human limitations requires guarding. There is an implicit philosophic tradition that there are set limitations for human experience, to be discovered in a blue-print preserved in some Institute of Technology. In the long ancestry of humans, from oysters to apes, and from apes to modern man, we can discern no trace of such set limitation. Nor can I discern any reason, apart from dogmatic assumption, why any factor in the universe should not be manifest in some flash of human consciousness. If the experience be unusual, verbalization may be for us impossible. We are then deprived of our chief instrument of recall, comparison, and communication. Nevertheless, we have no ground to limit our capacity for experience by our existing technology of expression.

Thus to say that human experience is limited is not to assert a standard limitation for all occasions of all humans. There are usual limitations depending on that dominant social order of our epoch, which we term the Laws of Nature and the habits of humanity.

This vagueness is not due to a morbid craving for metaphysics. It haunts our most familiar experiences. Consider the following set of notions:—The weight of that man: The height of that man: The intelligence of that man: The kindness of that man: The happiness of that man: The identity of that man with his previous self yesterday.

In the first place, the exact meaning of 'that man'—body and soul—would puzzle the wisest to express. Yet each phrase is sufficiently clear for inexact common sense. Secondly, the small in-

conspicuous words in various phrases seem to alter their meaning from phrase to phrase. In the above examples, consider the little word 'of'. There is nothing about it alarmingly metaphysical. My small dictionary gives as its first meaning "Associated or connected with". I suggest to you that 'weight', and 'height', and 'intelligence', and 'kindness', and 'happiness', and 'self-identity with a previous existence', are each of them 'associated or connected with' a man in its own peculiar way. Thus in each phrase the word 'of' has changed its meaning from its use in the other phrases. Yet, after all, there is a fundamental identity underlying all these changes; and the pompous phrase 'associated or connected with' is the best that the dictionary can do in the way of reminding us of that fact.

This conclusion has an important bearing on Logic. Consider the phrase 'S is P'. This proposition is a way of drawing your attention to 'the P-ness of S', either for the sake of belief, or for some other purpose. If we neglect the irrelevant psychological accompaniments in the production of this phrase, we see that the word 'is' in 'S is P' reproduces the meaning of the word 'of' in 'the P-ness of S'. Thus the meaning of 'is' varies with changes in S or in P.

But an argument consists in a preliminary grouping of propositions, together with a deduction of other propositions. Thus in addition to the criticism of the original propositions as to truth or falsehood, we require a criticism as to whether the undoubted changes of meaning, in the same word appearing in different propositions, are relevant to the argument. Also as new propositions are deduced the same criticism is required. Thus the simple-minded notion of logical premisses vanishes. The little words 'is', 'and', 'or', 'together', are traps of ambiguity.

Of course gross common sense can usually settle the matter. But experience has shown that as soon as you leave the beaten track of vague clarity, and trust to exactness, you will meet difficulties. I remember when Bertrand Russell discovered his well-known paradox. He sent it by letter to Frege who was then alive. Frege's answering letter began with the sentence, 'Alas, arithmetic totters'.

One source of vagueness is deficiency of language. We can see the variations of meaning; although we cannot verbalize them in

any decisive, handy manner. Thus we cannot weave into a train of thought what we can apprehend in flashes. We are left with the deceptive identity of the repeated word. Philosophy is largely the effort to lift such insights into verbal expression. For this reason, conventional English is the twin sister to barren thought. Plato had recourse to myth.

The method of algebra embodies the greatest discovery for the partial remedy of defective language. The procedure of the method is to select a few notions of the simplest interconnections of things; such connections for example as are expressed by the words 'is', 'of', 'and', 'or', 'plus', 'minus', 'more than', 'less than', 'equivalent to', and so on indefinitely. A small group of such terms is selected, on the principle that expressions containing them are again capable of interconnection by these same notions.

The fundamental assumption is that these basic connectives retain an invariable meaning throughout the algebraic development of patterns, and of patterns of patterns. The legitimacy of this assumption is guarded by the device of the 'real variable', as it is termed. Symbols, such as the single letters, $p, q, r, x, y, z, u, v, w$, are used under the assumption that each symbol indicates one and the same individual thing in its repetitions throughout the complex pattern. Also it is assumed that the things represented yield meaningful patterns as thus connected. Also it is assumed that the inevitable variation of meaning infused into these basic symbols of interconnection by the diversity of the variables, is not such as to affect that meaning which the pattern contains for the observers in question.

There are thus four fundamental assumptions, namely: (1) The invariableness of the basic terms of interconnection (the connectives), (2) The invariableness of the unspecified entities indicated by the symbols for 'real variables', (3) The meaningfulness of the patterns of real variables, thus connected, (4) The irrelevance to the argument of the completion of meaning infused into the basic connectives by the unspecified real variables thus connected. Namely, the meaning as in assumption (1) is not in fact invariable, but the variation is irrelevant.

These principles of algebraic symbolism express the concurrence of mathematical formal principles with accidental factors. This

concurrence is inevitable for the production of meaningful composition. And apart from composition there is no meaning, that is to say, there is nothing. The clarity is deceptive, as the clash of the first and fourth assumptions shows. Finally we are forced back to the pragmatic justification—It works. And yet it 'totters', unless care be taken.

The basic connectives are the relevant mathematical-formal principles. The real variables are the unspecified accidental factors. But the connection of the accidents is not a mere mathematical-formal principle. It is the concrete accidental fact of those accidents as thus connected. This suffusion of the connective by the things connected is the most general expression of the genetic-functional character of the universe. It also explains the vagueness which shrouds our metaphysical insight. We are unable to complete the approximation of disengaging the principles from the accidents of their exemplifications.

Necessity requires accident and accident requires necessity. Thus the algebraic method is our best approach to the expression of necessity, by reason of its reduction of accident to the ghost-like character of the real variable.

It follows from this explanation of the algebraic method, that our mathematics and our symbolic logic, as hitherto developed, represent only a minute fragment of its possibilities. In making this statement I shelter myself behind a quotation (*Sophist* 253 CD):

Stranger. Now since we have agreed that the classes or genera also commingle with one another, or do not commingle, in the same way, must not he possess some science and proceed by the processes of reason [he] who is to show correctly which of the classes harmonize with which, and which reject one another, and also if he is to show whether there are *some elements extending through all and holding them together so that they can mingle, and again, when they separate, whether there are other universal causes of separation.*

Theaetetus. Certainly he needs science, and perhaps the greatest of sciences.

Also to Plato we can add the authority of Leibniz. And now having invoked such support, I can cease the defence of the attempt to bring together the genetic-functional and the mathematical-formal methods in one philosophic outlook.

Philosophic thought has to start from some limited section of our experience—from epistemology, or from natural science, or

from theology, or from mathematics. Also the investigation always retains the taint of its starting point. Every starting point has its merits, and its selection must depend upon the individual philosopher.

My own belief is that at present the most fruitful, because the most neglected, starting point is that section of value-theory which we term aesthetics. Our enjoyment of the values of human art, or of natural beauty, our horror at the obvious vulgarities and defacements which force themselves upon us—all these modes of experience are sufficiently abstracted to be relatively obvious. And yet evidently they disclose the very meaning of things.

Habits of thought and sociological habits survive because in some broad sense they promote aesthetic enjoyment. There is an ultimate satisfaction to be derived from them. Thus when the pragmatist asks whether 'it works', he is asking whether it issues in aesthetic satisfaction. The judge of the Supreme Court is giving his decision on the basis of the aesthetic satisfaction of the harmonization of the American Constitution with the activities of modern America.

Now there are two sides to aesthetic experience. In the first place, it involves a subjective sense of individuality. It is *my* enjoyment. I may forget myself; but all the same the enjoyment is mine, the pleasure is mine, and the pain is mine. Aesthetic enjoyment demands an individualized universe.

In the second place, there is the aesthetic object which is identified in experience as the source of subjective feeling. In so far as such abstraction can be made, so that there is a definite object correlated to a definite subjective reaction, there is a singular exclusive unity in this aesthetic object. There is a peculiar unity in a good pattern.

Consider a good picture. It expresses a unity of mutual relevance. It resents the suggestion of addition. No extra patch of scarlet can be placed in it without wrecking its unity.

The point is that the subjective unity of feeling and the objective unity of mutual relevance express respectively a relation of exclusion to the world beyond. There is a completion which rejects alternatives. Mere omission is characteristic of confusion. Rejection belongs to intelligible pattern.

This doctrine extends, or distorts, the meaning of another saying of Plato, when he says that not-being is a form of being. Here I am saying that rejection is a form of prehension. But I fully agree with Dr. Ushenko that this doctrine requires examination, and probably should be recast. However, I adhere to the position that it is an approximation to an important truth.

We must end with my first love—Symbolic Logic. When in the distant future the subject has expanded, so as to examine patterns depending on connections other than those of space, number, and quantity—when this expansion has occurred, I suggest that Symbolic Logic, that is to say, the symbolic examination of pattern with the use of real variables, will become the foundation of aesthetics. From that stage it will proceed to conquer ethics and theology. The circle will then have made its full turn, and we shall be back to the logical attitude of the epoch of St. Thomas Aquinas. It was from St. Thomas that the seventeenth century revolted by the production of its mathematical method, which is the re-birth of logic.

The result of our human outlook is the interweaving of apparent order with apparent accident. The order appears as necessity suffused with accident, the accident appears as accident suffused with necessity. The necessity is, in a sense, static; but it is the static form of functional process. The process is what it is by reason of its form, and the form exists as the essence of process.

To hold necessity apart from accident, and to hold form apart from process, is an ideal of the understanding. The approximation to this ideal is the romantic history of the development of human intelligence.

My relation to Hegel's philosophy has, I hope, been made plain by this paper. He is a great thinker who claims respect. My criticism of his procedure is that when in his discussion he arrives at a contradiction, he construes it as a crisis in the universe. I am not so hopeful of our status in the nature of things. Hegel's philosophic attitude is that of a god. But I must leave Hegel to those who have studied him at first hand.

ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION 1936

TENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF OFFICERS

American Council of Learned Societies

The seventeenth annual meeting of the Council was held at the Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D.C., on January 31 and February 1, 1936. The Association was represented by Professors S. P. Lamprecht and A. O. Lovejoy, the latter acting as alternate for Professor F. J. E. Woodbridge. The Secretary represented the Association at the twelfth annual conference of the secretaries of the Constituent Societies on January 30 and was present also at the meetings of the Council. The conference of secretaries discussed problems of the organization and administration of the business of the Societies. The Council's deliberations were concerned with the present status and future organization of the departments of the Humanities in American Universities and Colleges and with the need to reorient the Council's activities in consequence of the considerable reduction in fluid funds at its disposal.

In spite of this reduction in funds \$1,000 was appropriated for assistance to the Bibliography of Philosophy. This sum has been paid, through the Secretary of the Board of Officers, to Professor John J. Coss for use on the Bibliography. Dr. Leland has specified that this sum, making a total of \$2,800 from the Council, will be its final contribution to this project. Other assisted projects of interest to members of this Association are the Documentary History of Primitivism (A. O. Lovejoy, George Boas and others) and the publication of *Structure and Reality* by D. W. Gotshalk.

Committees

Bibliography

The Association's permanent Committee on Bibliography reports progress as follows on the Bibliography of Philosophy which is being made for the years since Rand's Bibliography.

The number of titles for which cards have been written, both altogether and since last year, is as follows:

	Nov. 1935	Sept. 1936	Dec. 1936
Periodical articles	6,000	8,550	9,000
Books	24,000	38,000	43,000
Total	30,000	46,550	52,000

All of the cards for articles have duplicates, and most of them have been checked and classified. The cards for books have not yet been checked, but about one third or one half of them have been classified.

The slight increase in the number of cards since September of this year is due to the fact that most of the time has been spent in checking and classifying previously collected titles.

The total number of titles to be included in the bibliography will probably be 80,000, instead of the 100,000 estimated last year.

In addition to Emerson Buchanan, there are now working on the bibliography two assistants, paid from the funds, 30 hours a week each; one assistant, paid from the funds, 15 hours a week; and two typists, provided by the National Youth Administration, 30 hours a month each.

Every effort is being bent to complete the work as planned by July 1, 1937, although the quality of the work is not in any case to be sacrificed. The classification is being done with great care; magazine articles seen, reviews used, and often books inspected. Verification is being carried on equally carefully.

For the Committee,

C. J. DUCASSE, *Chairman*

Carus Lectures

Financial assurance for a further series of Carus lectures has as yet not been procurable. The Committee, however, is not without some hope that this obstacle will shortly be removed and that arrangements for the fifth series may then proceed rapidly.

For the Committee,

EDWARD L. SCHAUB, *Chairman*

Employment

Except for the beginning of a survey of the amount and character of the offerings in philosophy in the universities and colleges in the United States, the work of the committee this year has been largely that of supplying the administration, where a teaching vacancy became known, with an account of the qualifications of the candidates on the committee's list. The academic biographies of about sixty-five candidates were forwarded to fourteen colleges where vacancies were known to exist, with the request that the claims of the candidates be carefully reviewed before a final decision should be made. In nearly all cases the information was acknowledged and welcomed.

For the Committee,

H. B. SMITH

The U. S. Department of Agriculture is interested in a movement among agricultural colleges to liberalize their curricula. Two developments along that line may be interesting to philosophers. One is the move toward courses in the history and philosophy of science; the other, toward including more social studies with philosophical implications. The preparation necessary for such teachers is philosophy, supported by correlative work either in the natural sciences or in social studies, especially economics and political science.

For the Committee,

CARL F. TAEUSCH

Ninth International Congress of Philosophy, Paris, 1937

The arrangements for the program of the Paris Congress are in the hands of its organizing committee. The committee of the American Philosophical Association has had two functions only. (1) The committee has sought to encourage a sizable and representative American participation.

To this end it has taken the initiative in urging outstanding American philosophers to present papers and has acted as an intermediary for the submission of titles to the French committee. According to present information, some twenty members of the Association plan to offer papers. (2) A sum of \$166.83 is at the committee's disposal. It has voted to divide this sum, after secretarial expenses have been met, between one representative of the Western and one of the Pacific Division. The purpose of this appropriation is to "equalize" travelling expenses so far as the modest fund available will permit. The representative is in each case to be designated by the President of the Division concerned.

For the Committee,

W. P. MONTAGUE, *Chairman*

Publication

Professor Gregory D. Walcott, General Editor of the *Source Books in the History of the Sciences*, reports as follows:

"Some progress, but not much, can be reported for the last year. The manuscript for a *Source Book in Geology*, which has been delayed for various reasons, is almost ready for the press. It should be on the market this coming year. Professor Barry has submitted an especially good outline for a *Source Book in Chemistry*. Final arrangements await his recovery from illness. Professor Harper has made definite advance in the preparation of a *Source Book in Botany*. He has been hampered by the dearth of competent translators, but at present is on the track of several. The other two editors, who have charge of volumes, have not yet reported. It is unfortunate that progress is so slow, but all the men involved are exceedingly busy. Any information in regard to good translators from French, German and Latin for the volumes on chemistry, botany and zoology would be much appreciated by the General Editor."

During the year four applications have been received for grants in aid of publication offered by the American Council of Learned Societies. Consideration of two of these has been delayed on account of incompleteness in the data submitted by the authors; one is now being examined by the Committee; and one has (in November) been awarded a grant by the Council on recommendation of the Committee. The latter is for the publication of a volume by Professor D. W. Gotshalk, of the University of Illinois, entitled *Structure and Reality*. The book will presumably appear sometime in the spring.

For the Committee,

E. A. BURTT, *Chairman*

FINANCIAL STATEMENT

Year ended December 31, 1936

Arthur E. Murphy, *Secretary*,
American Philosophical Association
Providence, Rhode Island

DEAR SIR:

In accordance with your instructions we have examined the accounts and records of American Philosophical Association for the year ended De-

ember 31, 1936 and submit herewith statement of cash receipts and disbursements, by funds, for the period under examination.

Bank balances were verified by reference to bank statements and pass books.

Receipts and disbursements were verified by examination of cancelled checks and other data on file.

We hereby certify that, in our opinion, the attached statement of cash receipts, disbursements and balances is correct.

Respectfully submitted,

WARD, FISHER & Co.
Accounts and Auditors

	General	Fund for	Fund for
	Treasury	Publication	International Congress of Philosophy
<i>Cash Balance, January 1, 1936</i>	\$493.05	\$9,470.76	\$162.10
<i>Cash Receipts:</i>			
Eastern Division	256.66		
Western Division	104.08		
Pacific Division	50.85		
Royalties (McGraw Hill Co.)		317.60	
Interest on bank deposits		110.12	2.43
Sale of volumes	4.00		2.50
Total	\$908.64	\$9,898.48	\$167.03
<i>Cash Disbursements:</i>			
American Council of Learned Societies—			
Dues	25.00		
Audit, 1935	10.00		
Printing and binding Volume IX, <i>Philosophical Review</i>	156.13		
Printing <i>Proceedings</i> , 1936, <i>Philosophical Review</i>	83.94		
M. T. McClure (National Committee on Unemployment)	41.00		
Express charges	28.52		
Stenographic and Clerical Expenses ..	12.40		
Binding one Volume of <i>Proceedings</i> for Record	1.50		
Bank charges10	.20
Total disbursements	\$358.49	\$.10	\$.20
Balances, December 31, 1936	\$550.15	\$9,898.38	\$166.83

RECAPITULATION OF FUNDS

General Treasury (R.I. Hospital National Bank—Checking Account)	\$ 550.15
Revolving Fund for Publication (R.I. Hospital Trust Co.—Part. Account No. 70787)	9,898.38
Fund for International Congress of Philosophy (R.I. Hospital Trust Co.—Part. Account No. 70815)	166.83
Total, all funds	<u>\$10,615.36</u>

The Chairman of the Board of Officers appointed C. J. Ducasse a delegate to the American Council of Learned Societies for the term ending in 1940.

The Association was represented at the annual meeting of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, held in Philadelphia on April 24 and 25, 1936, by Percy Hughes and Carl F. Tausch.

For the Board of Officers,

ARTHUR E. MURPHY, *Secretary*

WESTERN DIVISION

President: Charles W. Morris.

Vice-President: Herbert Martin.

Secretary-Treasurer: Albury Castell.

Executive Committee: The foregoing officers and V. C. Aldrich, C. D. W. Hildebrand, G. R. Morrow, Charles M. Perry.

The thirty-seventh annual meeting of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association was held at the State University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, on April 23, 24, 25, 1936.

The following program was presented:

Plato and Greek Slavery	G. R. Morrow
Plato's Secret	R. C. Lodge
St. Augustine's Conception of Time	H. Hausheer
Address of welcome by Dean C. E. Seashore	
Discussion Meeting: Rational and Ethical Basis of Social-Economic Policy	T. V. Smith, F. C. Sharp, H. O. Eaton,
J. W. Hudson, E. Jordan, Bonno Tapper, Frank Knight, Charner Perry.	
On Our Lack of Certainty as to the Truth of Any and All Propositions	Gardner Williams
Implication and Deducibility	A. F. Emch
Aristotle's Theory of Opposites	G. G. Leckie
The Theory of "Conditional" Arguments	D. F. Swenson
The Use of Fine Art	G. W. Beiswanger
Are There Objective Standards of Value?	L. P. Chambers
An Attempt at a Classification of Human Rights	J. W. Hudson
Presidential Address: Social Ideals and the Law	E. T. Mitchell
Discussion Meeting: Nature of Philosophical Method	C. W. Morris,
E. L. Schaub, Charles Hartshorne, H. Feigl, D. F. Swenson, W. H. Werkmeister, Virgil Michel.	

The minutes of the preceding meeting were approved as mimeographed.

On motion by Professor Sharp it was voted that the Western Division meet at Knox College, Galesburg, Illinois, in 1937.

It was reported that a sum of from \$700 to \$800, in addition to what the American Council of Learned Societies and the Humanities Council of Columbia University could be depended on to supply, would be required to complete the work planned for the year on the Bibliography of Philosophy. It was voted that the Treasurer be instructed to pay out of the funds of the Division a *pro rata* share of such residual cost for this work, provided that the other Divisions of the Association take similar action.

The Executive Committee recommended the following candidates for admission to membership: Ruth Willis Pray, Oklahoma College for Women, Chickasha, Okla.; J. A. McWilliams, St. Louis University, St. Louis, Mo.; I. K. Stephens, S.M.U., Dallas, Texas; Bruce Waters, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio; W. H. Reither, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio; Z. Diesendruck, Hebrew Union College, Cincinnati, Ohio; G. G. Leckie, University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill.; G. T. Vanderlugt, Carroll College, Waukesha, Wis.; G. W. Beiswanger, Monticello College, Godfrey, Ill.; Mary Verda, St. Mary's College, Notre Dame, Ind.; D. T. Howard, Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.; Willis Moore, University of Missouri, Columbus, Mo.; and L. W. Stalnaker, Drake University, Des Moines, Iowa.

Professor McClure submitted a written report as chairman of the Committee on Unemployment. He requested to be relieved of the responsibilities of this office, and asked for clarification from the Western Division as to its understanding of the present status of his committee. The resignation of Professor McClure was accepted with regrets, and with an expression of thanks for the work which he had done in this capacity. On motion by Professor Holland it was voted that it was the sense of the meeting that there should be a continuing Committee on Unemployment in the General Association, and that the Western Division should participate in this committee. On motion by Professor Chambers it was voted that nominations for representative of the Western Division on this committee should be submitted to the incoming president, from which he should be authorized to make an appointment.

Professor Eaton made a brief announcement with reference to the newly formed Southwestern Philosophical Association.

On motion by Professor Sharp a vote of thanks was extended to the State University of Iowa, and to the Department of Philosophy of that institution for its hospitality and for the excellent arrangements for the meeting.

Professor Morris announced that Professor E. T. Mitchell, University of Texas, had in his possession a number of extra copies of the *Proceedings* of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy, which he would be glad to send to any of the members of the Division who would be willing to pay the mailing costs of 25 cents per copy.

The following report of the treasurer was adopted:

Receipts

Balance on hand May 3, 1935	\$540.26
Annual dues	314.24
Interest	6.06

\$860.56

Disbursements

General Association	
Membership	\$42.50
Proceedings	64.60
Stationery, dues cards	10.87
Postage, bank charges, express, telegrams	16.88
Stenographic services	14.12
Harris bibliography	15.00

\$163.97

Balance, April 26, 1936 696.59

\$860.56

A. CORNELIUS BENJAMIN, *Secretary*

EASTERN DIVISION

President: G. Watts Cunningham.

Vice-President: D. W. Prall.

Secretary-Treasurer: Cornelius Krusé.

Executive Committee: The foregoing officers and Edgar S. Brightman, Albert G. A. Balz, Katherine E. Gilbert, Raphael Demos, Horace L. Friess, Robert Scoon, and J. M. Warbeke.

The thirty-sixth annual meeting of the Eastern Division was held at Harvard University and Radcliffe College, Cambridge, Massachusetts, on December 28, 29, and 30, 1936. The following program was presented:

Cognition and Value

Cognition and Value Reexamined	Cornelius Krusé
Cognition and Moral Value	Ledger Wood
Value Propositions and Verifiability	Wilbur M. Urban

Joint Session with the Association for Symbolic Logic

Some Logical Problems Encountered by a Physicist P. W. Bridgman
The Formal Distinction between Asserted and Unasserted

Propositions A. A. Bennett
Systems of 'Complete Logic' within the Scope of Goedel's Theorem ..

..... F. B. Fitch
A Calculus of Individuals H. S. Leonard and H. N. Goodman

Philosophical Problems in the Social Sciences

Economic Thought and Economic Development during the Last 150
Years H. von Beckerath
The State of Nature and the Social Sciences A. G. A. Balz

The Place of Sanctions in the Administration of a Democratic Society	Carl F. Tausch
<i>The Philosophy of Whitehead</i>	
Organic Categories in Whitehead	G. Vlastos
Negative Prehensions	A. Ushenko
The Philosophy of Whitehead	John Dewey
Remarks	A. N. Whitehead
<i>Presidential Address</i>	
An Empirical Approach to God	Edgar S. Brightman
<i>American Philosophy Since 1900</i>	
American Philosophy in the First Decade of the Twentieth Century	R. B. Perry
The Divorce between American Philosophy and Psychology Since James	Herbert W. Schneider
The Social A Priori	J. A. Irving
Ethics from the Point of View of Modern Science	Harold Chapman Brown
The Ideal Life	Paul Weiss
Meaning and Implication	Morris R. Cohen
What Is a Problem?	George Boas
The Fundamental Postulates of the Cartesian Systems ...	Sarah H. Brown
The business meeting was held on Wednesday, December 30, at 11:30 A.M., President Brightman presiding. The minutes of the thirty-fifth annual meeting were approved as printed.	
The following Treasurer's Report was approved:	
<i>Receipts:</i>	
Balance brought forward	\$2,849.87
Membership dues	798.65
Interest	44.30
<i>Total</i>	\$3,692.82
<i>Expenditures:</i>	
Dues to National Association	\$ 107.25
Printing of Annual <i>Proceedings</i>	149.41
Expenses of Annual Meeting	131.15
Printing, mailing of abstracts	18.00
Printing of announcements, programs	39.75
Postage	17.00
Secretarial Assistance	19.50
<i>Total</i>	482.06
<i>Balance on hand</i>	\$3,210.76
Audited and found correct: PERCY HUGHES	
HORACE L. FRIESS	
Auditors	

Brief reports from the national committees on Bibliography, on the Ninth International Congress of Philosophy, and on Opportunities for Employment in Philosophy, were read by the Secretary.

The amendment to Article II, Section 3, of the Division's constitution, presented at the last Business Meeting was discussed. As amended by unanimous consent it substitutes for the former provision the following: "There shall be a committee of three to nominate officers for the Division. The senior member (chairman) shall retire each year to be replaced by a new member appointed by the President". The amendment was unanimously adopted. For the present year it was voted to authorize the President of the Division to appoint three members to constitute the committee, one to retire each year for the next three years.

A memorial minute for A. A. Bowman was read by Robert Scoon and one for A. K. Rogers by D. C. Macintosh. A memorial for Mary Hegeler Carus, prepared by E. L. Schaub, was read by the secretary. It was voted that all be included in the minutes of the Division, as published in the annual *Proceedings*, and they are accordingly here included.

The Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association wishes to record its sorrow and sense of loss in the death of Professor A. A. Bowman, formerly an active member and some time Vice-President. A Scotsman by birth and education, he was called in 1912 to Princeton University, where he made an outstanding success of teaching philosophy and religion, and enjoyed what he later described as the happiest years of his life. Shortly after the outbreak of the war, he joined the British army, and during the fighting he was captured by the Germans and taken to a camp; but he used the opportunity to write a volume of sonnets and organize a university among his fellow prisoners. After the armistice he returned to his work in Princeton, where he remained until 1926 when he was called back to his alma mater, Glasgow University, first as Professor of Logic, and latterly as Professor of Moral Philosophy. It may not be generally known that Princeton, recognizing his distinction as a teacher, constructive thinker, and human being, made a supreme effort to recall him; and that, after a long mental struggle, he declined in order to continue his contribution to his native land as educator and public lecturer. For with him philosophy was really a way of life, and love of truth found its full meaning in the activity of concrete loyalties. He twice returned to this country to lecture, in California and in Princeton, and to refresh the ties that he said were never far below the surface of his thought. In his premature death, British and American philosophy suffered a tragic bereavement. (Robert Scoon)

In the death of Mary Hegeler Carus, June 27, 1936, the American Philosophical Association, along with the cause of philosophy in general, has sustained a heavy loss. Throughout a period of half a century Mrs. Carus gave a generous measure of her disciplined intellectual powers, as well as of her financial resources, to the furtherance of a philosophy and of an outlook upon life oriented by the methods and results of scientific investigation. She collaborated with her father, Edward Hegeler, in the founding of the Open Court Publishing Company and of its two journals, *The Open Court* and *The Monist*; she assisted him also in the preparation of a number of his articles. Upon her marriage to Dr. Paul Carus, the latter was given the chief responsibility for the enterprises of the Open Court Publishing Company, and these he carried up to the time of his death. During the long years of his distinguished services, however, he constantly received the effective coöperation of his wife, Mary Hegeler Carus. Upon

her shoulders fell the burden of continuing the work to which her father and her husband had dedicated themselves. As the head of the Open Court Publishing Company she not merely continued its traditional activities but also gave encouragement and support to a valuable series of mathematical monographs, and instituted the Paul Carus lectures on philosophical themes. Much she did likewise to promote understanding between the major religious and cultural groups of the world, and to bring them into mutually fruitful relationships. She will long be remembered as, on the one hand, a devoted daughter, wife, and mother, and, on the other, a personality of intellectual zeal, social understanding and sympathy, and unswerving loyalty to high cultural interests. (Edward L. Schaub)

Dr. Arthur Kenyon Rogers, who died on November 1, 1936, was widely known as the author of *A Student's History of Philosophy*, which since it first appeared a generation ago has probably been used by more American college students than any other text-book in its field. He was also the author of numerous books and articles, and his writings are appreciated by his fellow-philosophers for their rugged independence and honesty of thought, their cogency of argument and sanity of judgment, and their clarity of expression. Born in 1868, Mr. Rogers received his A.B. degree from Colby College in 1891, and after some study at the Hartford Theological Seminary and Johns Hopkins University he completed his work for the degree of Ph.D. in Philosophy at the University of Chicago in 1898. From 1900 to 1910 he was professor of Philosophy and Education in Butler University, from 1910 to 1914 professor of Philosophy in the University of Missouri, and he occupied the same position in Yale University from 1914 until 1920, in which year he retired in order to devote himself more exclusively to writing on philosophical topics. Dr. Rogers' voluntary relinquishment of the teaching task at the age of 52 was regretted, especially by his graduate students, over the development of whose thought his informal, discussional method and penetrating Socratic questioning had great influence. But their loss meant gain to the wider circle of students and teachers of philosophy who have found stimulus and enlightenment in the books which have come from his pen in the past sixteen years, namely, *English and American Philosophy since 1800*, *Morals in Review*, *A Theory of Ethics*, *What is Truth?*, *The Socratic Problem*, and *Ethics and Moral Tolerance*. In ethics he was an individualist who was at the same time deeply concerned for social well-being. In epistemology, he will be remembered as one of the seven authors of the much-discussed *Essays in Critical Realism*. It is to be hoped that a work upon which he is known to have been engaged in the past few years will be found to have been brought sufficiently near to completion to make possible its posthumous publication. (D. C. Macintosh)

Professor Cohen spoke briefly on the contributions to philosophy of Wm. T. Harris. It was voted that he be requested to put into writing the substance of his remarks for inclusion in the minutes of the Division; and it is accordingly included here.

When William T. Harris died in 1909, the American Philosophical Association gave fitting expression to its high regard for his personality and services, and to the sense of our common loss; and as centenaries are generally the occasions for critical evaluations of a man's historical significance or of his permanent contribution in the field of his endeavor, they are properly occasions for individual rather than collective expression. There is reason, however, for making an exception in the case of the centenary of the birth of William T. Harris. For not only are there still amongst us those who knew him and received vital philosophic stimulus

from him, but his services to philosophical studies in America and to the general cause of liberal enlightenment are worthy of lasting and grateful remembrance.

A century after his birth we do well to recall again his lifelong devotion to philosophy, how through his own efforts, at most discouraging expense, he launched the first periodical in English devoted exclusively to philosophy and how he continued to edit and publish it from 1867 to 1893. It was the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* that not only made many philosophic classics available to English readers but gave the encouragement of publication to the early writings of men as diverse as Charles S. Peirce, Josiah Royce, George Holmes Howison, Thomas Davidson, Thorstein Veblen, Nicholas Murray Butler and John Dewey.

It is natural that in regard to Harris' specific philosophic doctrines we should be as far from unanimity as we are in regard to those of his great master, Hegel; and it may be inevitable that in the shifting of our preoccupations and perspectives such pioneering work as he did for American philosophy should not loom so large on our present horizon as it did a generation ago. But his effort to make philosophy a key to the interpretation of the institutions of civilization, of art, literature, science, religion, and world history, points to what is still a vital task for us, perhaps more urgent today than ever before.

While Harris was not a regular teacher in any of our colleges or universities, his whole life was dedicated to the teaching of philosophy to an ever-widening public. Not only through the Concord School of philosophy and similar ventures but also throughout his long and active career in educational administration he sought to show how philosophy can rationalize and humanize the substance and method of all teaching. No doubt, in the field of education, as in other realms of practical endeavor, "time makes ancient good uncouth". But even where we may no longer accept without reservation Harris' views on the school curriculum, we cannot well get away from his guiding principle that the determination of what we should teach must be founded on a conception of civilization, and that those engaged in carrying it out should be, above all, men and women of wide culture and broad outlook who can integrate the processes of education into a rational view of the character and aims of the whole continuing life of humanity of which all individuals and all institutions are parts. Conservative as Harris was in his belief that we must preserve and treasure the great achievements of the past, no one before him insisted more clearly that we must also be ever alert to rationalize and liberalize what we wish to hand on to our successors.

It is well to cherish the memory of what Harris did to liberate philosophy in our country from traditional, provincial, and sectarian limitations, to the end that it may become a vision that can lift us above inherited superstition and partisan prejudice. For this is a task that requires everlasting effort and constant rededication. In the vicissitudes of time, philosophy justifies itself by the example which men like William T. Harris give of the possibility that the philosophic life may be a supreme form of human service. (Morris R. Cohen, C. M. Bakewell, Arthur O. Lovejoy.)

On recommendation of the Executive Committee, the following were elected to membership in the Division:

Active members: Prof. S. L. Akers, Prof. John W. Blyth, Prof. Emmanuel Chapman, Dr. Arthur Hazard Dakin, Prof. L. Harold DeWolf, Prof. Rowland Gray-Smith, Prof. T. A. Kantonen, Dr. Donald Meiklejohn, Prof. Robert Pollock, Prof. Paul W. Sprague, Prof. Vernon Venable, Dr. Livingston Welch, Prof. Max Wertheimer, Mrs. James H. Woods.

Associate Members: Dr. Hanna Hafkesbrink, Mr. James K. Feibleman, Mr. Joseph B. Gittler.

The invitation of Princeton University for the 1937 meeting of the Division was unanimously accepted.

The Secretary presented a recommendation from the Executive Committee that the Executive Committee of 1937 "be instructed to arrange a joint meeting with the American Catholic Philosophical Association on the afternoon of the third day of the next Annual Meeting". The sentiment of the meeting was favorable to a joint meeting at such time as it could be so arranged as to insure that a substantial number of members of the Division would be present. On motion of Professor Lovejoy it was voted that the new Executive Committee be empowered to act at its discretion in the matter in the light of the discussion at the Business Meeting.

On motion of Professor H. B. Smith it was voted, in conformity with the action of the Western Division, to approve the continuance of the National Committee on Opportunities for Employment in Philosophy, the Division's representative on the Committee to be appointed by its President.

The nominating committee (R. B. Perry, chairman, W. H. Sheldon and W. G. Everett) presented the following nominees: for President, G. Watts Cunningham; for Vice-President, D. W. Prall; for Secretary-Treasurer, Cornelius Krusé; for members of the Executive Committee, to complete the term of D. W. Prall, Albert G. A. Balz, and for a three-year term, Robert Scoon and J. M. Warbeke. All were unanimously elected.

On motion of Professor Perry it was voted that the Secretary be instructed to include in the *Proceedings* of the Association some adequate record of the memorable meeting in honor of Professor Whitehead. In pursuance of that instruction the papers of Professors Dewey and Whitehead are included in this volume.

Votes of thanks were tendered to the retiring Secretary-Treasurer and to Harvard University and Radcliffe College for their hospitality.

ARTHUR E. MURPHY, *Secretary-Treasurer*

PACIFIC DIVISION

President: D. W. Prall.

Vice-President: Donald S. Mackay.

Secretary-Treasurer: Everett W. Hall.

Executive Committee: The foregoing officers and H. G. Townsend *ex officio* for one year, Everett J. Nelson (1937), W. R. Dennes (1937), D. C. Williams (1938).

The thirteenth annual meeting was held at Mills College, California, December 28, 29, and 30, 1936. The following program was presented:

Intuition and its Substitutes	John W. Buckham
The Revolt against Metaphysics	H. L. Searles
Philosophy and the Unconscious	H. Jeffery Smith
The Cosmic Variables	Charles Hartshorne
The Nature of Modal Propositions	Everett J. Nelson
The Copula in Aristotle and Afterwards	Edward O. Sisson
Husserl's Phenomenology and Thomistic Philosophy	K. F. Reinhardt
Different Species of Perspective Realism	William Savery
Addresses at a joint luncheon of the Pacific Coast Branch of the American	

Historical Association and the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association	Frederick Anderson and Gilbert Chinard
The Relativity of Value	Barnett Savery
On Cultural Relativism in Ethics	S. Kerby-Miller

The Presidential Address

On the Possibility of a Better World	H. G. Townsend
Science and Philosophy	Otis Lee
Metaphors and Metaphysics	Edward Strong
Language and Metaphysical Truth	Hubert G. Alexander

The business meeting was held on December 30 at 9 A.M. The minutes of the 1935 meeting were approved as printed.

The treasurer's report was read and approved:

Receipts

Balance on hand December 26, 1935	\$348.95
Dues Received	150.00
Total	<u>\$498.95</u>

Expenditures

A. P. A. Treasury	\$ 50.85
Smoker (1935)	3.40
Postage	9.33
Clerical Help	3.25
Pre-session (1935)	4.00
Printing and mimeographing	13.91
Miscellaneous50
Total	<u>85.24</u>

Balance on hand December 27, 1936	<u>\$413.71</u>
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Audited by D. A. PIATT

It was voted that the treasurer of the Pacific Division be instructed to pay to the Committee on the Bibliography of Philosophy a *pro rata* share of the \$700 asked of the American Philosophical Association to complete their project.

Elmo Robinson reported the organization of a Pacific Conference on the Teaching of Philosophy, to hold meetings in conjunction with the annual meetings of the Pacific Division. It will be open to all interested in the teaching of philosophy upon the payment of 50 cents annual dues.

It was voted that the matter of the continuance of the Employment Committee and the representation of the Pacific Division thereon be referred to the Executive Committee with power to act.

It was voted that the place and dates of the 1937 meeting be referred to the Executive Committee with power to act.

The following were elected to active membership in the Pacific Division: George N. Belknap, Harry Ruja, and Barnett Savery.

D. C. Williams was elected to the Executive Committee for a term of two years.

The following officers were elected for 1937: President, D. W. Prall; Vice-President, Donald S. Mackay.

A vote of thanks was extended to Mills College and to members of the Association at Mills College for their warm hospitality.

EVERETT W. HALL, *Secretary-Treasurer*

OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR 1937

(Addresses are given in the list of members.)

Board of Officers:

D. W. Prall, *Chairman* (1936), G. Watts Cunningham, Charles W. Morris, Albury Castell, Cornelius Krusé, E. W. Hall, Arthur E. Murphy, *Secretary* (1938).

Delegates to the American Council of Learned Societies:

Sterling P. Lamprecht (1938), C. J. Ducasse (1940).

Committees:

Bibliography—

C. J. Ducasse, *Chairman*, D. S. Robinson, D. W. Prall.

Carus Lectures—

E. L. Schaub, *Chairman*, H. B. Alexander, C. I. Lewis (1937), E. B. McGilvary (1937), R. A. Tsanoff (1937), G. P. Adams (1939), C. J. Ducasse (1939), G. W. Cunningham (1939).

International Congress of Philosophy—

W. P. Montague, *Chairman*, A. O. Lovejoy, Glenn R. Morrow, W. H. Sheldon, H. G. Townsend, Arthur E. Murphy, *Secretary*.

Publication—

E. A. Burt, *Chairman* (1937), G. P. Adams (1938), W. K. Wright (1939), G. S. Brett (1940).

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